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ABSTRACT
Alikhashashneh, Enas A. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2019. Using Machine
Learning Techniques to Improve Static Code Analysis Tools Usefulness. Major
Professor: James H. Hill.
This dissertation proposes an approach to reduce the cost of manual inspections
for as large a number of false positive warnings that are being reported by Static Code
Analysis (SCA) tools as much as possible using Machine Learning (ML) techniques.
The proposed approach neither assume to use the particular SCA tools nor depends
on the specific programming language used to write the target source code or the
application. To reduce the number of false positive warnings we first evaluated a
number of SCA tools in terms of software engineering metrics using a highlighted
synthetic source code named the Juliet test suite. From this evaluation, we concluded
that the SCA tools report plenty of false positive warnings that need a manual
inspection. Then we generated a number of datasets from the source code that forced
the SCA tool to generate either true positive, false positive, or false negative warnings.
The datasets, then, were used to train four of ML classifiers in order to classify the
collected warnings from the synthetic source code. From the experimental results of
the ML classifiers, we observed that the classifier that built using the Random Forests
(RF) technique outperformed the rest of the classifiers. Lastly, using this classifier
and an instance-based transfer learning technique, we ranked a number of warnings
that were aggregated from various open-source software projects. The experimental
results show that the proposed approach to reduce the cost of the manual inspection
of the false positive warnings outperformed the random ranking algorithm and was
highly correlated with the ranked list that the optimal ranking algorithm generated.
11. INTRODUCTION
The most critical goal of the software engineering today is how to build secure software
that continues functioning properly under malicious attack [1]. There are several of
procedures that software developers use to build secure software, such as designing
software to be secure, testing software for security issues, educating themselves by
leveraging best practices of software engineering, detecting common software defects
and threats such as buffer overflows and SQL injection early in the software life cycle,
and minimizing potential security holes in the software by reducing its complexity and
extensibility.
Additionally, there are several practices that can be applied to various software
artifacts to increase the security and enhance quality. For example, abuse cases,
security requirements, and risk analysis can be applied to software requirements and
use cases. Further, enforcing different code analysis approaches to the software source
code and/or to the compiled versions of the source code can help uncover possible
security vulnerabilities. In general, the code analysis approaches can be divided
into two main groups: Static Code Analysis (SCA) and Dynamic Program Analysis
(DPA) [2].
DPA has proven to be an effective technique for finding potential security defects
in the source code by analyzing the proprieties of a program while it is executing [3] [4].
Moreover, the DPA technique relies on program instrumentation to modify the original
program source code for the purpose of gathering traces and collecting an efficient
collection of run-time information to find and understand the problematic code [5].
However, DPA suffers from the overhead of program execution. Likewise, DPA can
only find defects in the part of the code that is actually executed. Moreover, relying
on DPA to detect possible flaws in software source code can be costly, as flaws are
reported late in the software development life cycle.
2Contrary to DPA, SCA examines software source code or the binary code without
execution to identify potential defects as a warning message [6]. Warnings generated
by SCA tools can be categorized into three main groups: false positive warnings,
which incorrectly report potential defects in the source code; true positive warnings,
which correctly report potential defects in the source code; and false negative warnings,
which do not generate messages for buggy code [7].
As SCA does not need to run the software code and check the output, the security
vulnerabilities can be detected early when it is still inexpensive to fix them. The tools
that automated SCA process inspects the source code using different techniques, such
as bug patterns, control-flow analysis, data-flow analysis, or lexical analysis instead
of relying on input stimuli; therefore, SCA tools can be generalized for all possible
program behaviors, not just to the current environment [8] [9] [10] [11]. In general,
SCA tools’ rules are written in ways to assist the software developers identify common
software errors that the compiler cannot find, such as Common Weakness Enumeration
(CWE) and SEI CERT coding rules violations.
Furthermore, some SCA tools operate on the source code, while others check
the intermediate code and libraries created. Moreover, different SCA tools support
different programming languages. For example, FindBugs, which is an open-source
SCA tool that supports Java [12]; Pylint, which is an open-source SCA tool widely used
by the Python community to reveal potential defects in the python source code [13];
and Klocwork, which is a commercial SCA tool that analyzes C/C++, C#, and Java
programming languages [14] [15].
Therefore, developers may choose from a mix of open-source and commercial
SCA tools, as different tools may produce different results [16]. Because software
developers and testers have many SCA tools to choose from, a common challenge
they face is identifying which tool to use against their code base. As mentioned
above, different SCA tools have unique strengths, weaknesses, and performance
characteristics, which we call their quality, in terms of being able to correctly identify
potential vulnerabilities. The problem is exacerbated when multiple SCA tools claim
3to check the same vulnerabilities but generate different results. In this scenario, at
least one of the SCA tools is generating both false positives and false negatives.
In the past, there have been several attempts to evaluate the quality of SCA tools.
For example, Knudsen [17] evaluated the ability of Visual Code Grepper, FindBugs,
and SonarQube to detect SQL, OS command, and LDAP injection vulnerabilities
against the Java Juliet Test Suite [18]. Likewise, McLean [19] evaluated several
SCA tools against widely used open-source applications, such as Apache OpenOffice
(AOO) [20], PuTTY [21], NMAP [22], and Wireshark [23]. Further, Velicheti et al. [24]
developed a framework for evaluating different SCA tools against the Juliet test suite
for C++ and Java. We further discuss the related literature on SCA tools evaluation
in Chapter 2.
Although there have been several attempts in the past to evaluate the quality of
SCA tools, none of the existing studies has performed an in-depth analysis of SCA tools
based on well-known software engineering metrics. For example, it is unknown how
software engineering metrics such as Knots [25], Essential Complexity [25], Cyclomatic
Complexity [25], Fan-Out (CountOutput) [26], and Fan-In (i.e., CountInput) [26]
impact an SCA tool’s true positive rate, which is an SCA tool’s ability to correctly
label a flaw, false positive rate, and false negative rate. Likewise, it is unknown which
software engineering metrics have the most impact on the true positive, false positive,
and false negative rates for an SCA tool.
These are important questions that need to be answered because if we can under-
stand how different software engineering metrics impact an SCA tool, then there is
potential to assist tool developers in understanding the weak spots in their analytical
capabilities. More important, we can provide guidelines for software engineers on
how to write better code, so that SCA tools will generate fewer false positives and
false negatives and, potentially, more true positives. We further defend our proposed
framework for evaluating the SCA tools in Chapter 3.
However, like many other tools and techniques, SCA tools have some demerits, one
of which is that the SCA tool cannot assist software developers in detecting when the
4software performs an unexpected operation. The second demerit of using SCA is that
the SCA tool may generate a massive number of false positives and false negatives. In
fact, Kremenek and Engler [27] observed that the false positive rates for some SCA
tools range between 30%—100%. Other studies, such as [28] [29] [30] have indicated
that 35%—91% of generated warnings are false positive.
One possible solution to this problem is to manually inspect all generated warnings
and identify them as either false or true positive warnings. Manually inspecting
generated warnings, however, is an expensive, time-consuming process that commonly
leads software developers to reject using SCA tools or ignore warnings that may
represent actual defects [31] [32]. Another solution is to automate post-processing
of warning messages to reduce cost of manual inspection using ML techniques that
classify and rank the generated warnings [33]. For example, if we assume that each
warning needs 2 minutes to determine if it is a true or positive warning, and the
software developer has 3,000 generated warnings, manual inspection will require 4.16
workdays. Conversely, ML techniques will need only 3–6 minutes.
Using ML techniques in the SCA field improves the usefulness of the SCA tools
and encourages software developers to use them. Unfortunately, there are two main
limitations to using the ML techniques. First, such techniques assume that there is
a large training set that can be used to identify and analyze relationships between
the features and label value. Generating of such a labeled dataset manually can be
considered as a time-consuming, costly, and boring process. To solve this challenge,
we extended the proposed framework in Chapter 3 to automatically compute the
software engineering metrics and automatically generate a number of labeled datasets
for the synthetic source code and a number of unlabeled datasets for open-source
software projects. Then, by using the generated datasets, we show how we utilize the
ML techniques to predict the SCA tool warnings based on the value of the software
engineering metrics. We further discuss the proposed framework in Chapter 4.
The second limitation of using ML techniques is that the prediction model that is
trained using the aggregated warnings from the synthetic source code can correctly
5classify and rank the warnings from the same or other synthetic source code. However,
in some cases the warnings generated from an open-source software project can be
too small for training and testing the prediction model. Thus, we cannot retrain the
prediction model that we used in Chapter 4 to classify or rank the warnings in the
open-source software projects. The best solution for this problem is for the developers
or testers to take a trained prediction model from another open-source software project
or form synthetic source code to successfully predict and rank the SCA tool warnings
in their software.
Unfortunately, an applying prediction model obtained from synthetic source code
and used in an open-source software project directly may decrease the prediction
model performance, and this may lead to misclassifying some important and actual
defects in the open-source software projects into false or fake warnings. Based on our
knowledge, none of the current studies addresses this problem. To solve this challenge,
in Chapter 5 we propose a framework for generating a number of unlabeled datasets
for a set of open-source software projects and transfer the prediction model that we
used in Chapter 4 to rank the warnings in the open-source software projects.
To reduce the number of false positive warnings, we hypothesize the following:
• Software engineering metrics values impact the true positive, false positive, and
false negative rates of the SCA tools.
• ML techniques can be used along with a collection of software engineering metrics
to predict if the source code will lead the SCA tool to emit either true positive,
false positive, or false negative warnings.
• Reducing false positive warnings by using ML techniques to rank the warnings.
Our approach is as follows: we evaluate a set of SCA tools using Juliet test
suite in terms of software engineering metrics. Next, we automatically generate a
number of labeled datasets from the synthetic source code that force the SCA tool to
generate false positive, true positive, and false negative warning. Then we train four
of ML techniques using the labeled datasets to predict and classify the SCA tools’
6warnings. Following, we use the best prediction model that outperformed the rest
of techniques to rank the SCA tool warnings generated using open-source software
projects. Finally, we validate our work with open-source software developers by having
them provide feedback on our warnings ranking list. Finally, sixty of computer science
and engineering undergraduate students verify our work over their source code.
With this understanding, the contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• We evaluate SCA tools using a number of open-source software projects and
a standardized test suite, such as the Juliet test suite in terms of software
engineering metrics.
• We generate twelve datasets to better represent the source code snippets that
forces the SCA tools to report a warning.
• We show the practicality of using ML techniques to classify the SCA tool
warnings.
• We design a framework for ranking SCA tool’s warnings and for eliminating
false positive warnings from the SCA tool’s output.
Our experimental results show that the proposed approach can reduce the amount
of time developers must spend triaging warning messages generated by SCA tools.
This is because developers can focus on warning messages that fall within a certain
threshold, as opposed to investigating all generated warning messages.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 discusses
existing approaches from the literature for evaluating and mitigating false positives
in SCA tools; Chapter 3 presents our framework for evaluating SCA tools in terms
of source code metrics; Chapter 4 describes our approach for classifying SCA tool
warnings into false positives, true positives, and false negatives; Chapter 5 presents our
framework on filtering out and ranking false positives from a tool’s output based on
the confidence value that was computed using the prediction model; Finally, Chapter 6
concludes the thesis.
72. RELATED WORK
This chapter discusses other approaches in the literature for evaluating the static code
analysis tools and for reducing the number of false positive reports from static code
analysis tools.
2.1 Evaluating SCA Tools
Many studies have evaluated SCA tools using different test cases. For example,
Knudsen et al. [17] tested the ability of three of the open-source SCA tools (Visual
Code Grepper, FindBugs, and SonarQube) to detect SQL, OS command, and LDAP
injection vulnerabilities against the Juliet Test Suite v1.2 for Java. The performance
of these tools is evaluated using the OWASP Benchmark Project, which provides a
system to test the performance of the SCA tools using the Youden index metric [34].
They conclude that FindBugs may be considered as the best tool in detecting LDAP
injections. This work differs from ours in two ways. First, our work evaluates SCA
tools in the context of different software engineering metrics; second, we evaluate the
SCA tools against 91 CWEs, while Knudsen et al. evaluated the SCA tools against
only three CWEs.
McLean et al. [19] compared two SCA tools, RATS and Flawfinder, and their
ability to find vulnerabilities in three open-source applications. The results of their
study concluded that the Flawfinder uncovered 3,189 flaws, while RATS found only
1,415 flaws. On the other hand, both SCA tools produce a large number of false
positives. Last, these authors recommend that the developers analyze their source code
using Flawfinder because this tool reports more valuable information to the developer
than RATS. Our work differs from McLean et al. in that our work evaluates the
8SCA tools in the context of software engineering metrics, and focuses on well-known
weaknesses (i.e., CWEs) in the Juliet Test Suite.
Baca et al. [35] ran a single SCA tool over four commercial software systems from
Ericsson. They concluded from the SCA tool outputs that the tool generated a large
number of false positive warnings and a low percentage of true warnings. Only 37.5%
of the false positive warnings were identified manually by the developers, a process
that consumed much of the developers’ time. Our work differs from Baca et al. in
that we evaluate five SCA tools in terms of the source code metrics using the Juliet
Test Suite.
Emanuelsson et al. [36] compared the performance of three SCA tools (Polyspace
Verifier, Coverity Prevent and Klocwork Insight) using a set of applications from
Ericsson. The authors in this study concluded that the Coverity and Klocwork tools
have a high value of true positive warnings. In other words, both of these tools
highlighted the most security vulnerabilities in the source code, while PolySpace tool
did not. Importantly, both Coverity and Klocwork produced a low rate of false positive
warnings, while PolySpace produced a high rate of false positive warnings. The work
presented in this paper evaluates the SCA tools in term of software engineering metrics
not only in terms of true positive and false positive warnings generated by these tools.
2.2 Classifying SCA Tools’ Warnings
A number of studies have applied machine learning techniques on characteristics
describing the warning generated by static code analysis tools.
Barstad et al. [37] investigated if they can predict the quality of the source code
based on the static metrics’ value (e.g., McCabe Cyclomatic Complexity and Halsted
metrics) using ML techniques (e.g., Naive Bayes (NB), KNN, and decision tree). In
their work, the source code was classified as "well written" or "badly written". Based on
their results, the NB outperforms the other classifiers. Our work differs their work in
three main ways. First, our work investigates the relationship between the SCA tools’
9warnings and the software engineering metrics. Second, we evaluate the proposed
approach against seven CWEs using two SCA tools, while Barstad et al. used the
SCA tools to compute the metrics value only. Lastly, they apply ML techniques to
predict the source code quality; while in this work we predict how the SCA tool will
behave on the given source code.
Yuksel et al. [38] proposed an approach to reduce the number of the false-positive
warnings that are emitted by SCA tools by applying 34 ML techniques over datasets
containing 10 different artifact characteristics. They conclude that the ML techniques
can be a useful approach to classify the SCA tools’ warnings because they achieved
87% accuracy. Our work is similar to their work in that we want to reduce the number
of false-positive warnings. The main difference between their work and our work,
however, is that we use the source code characteristic to predict the SCA tool behavior
(i.e., the SCA tool will generate true positive, false positive, or false negative warnings)
on the source code.
Koc et al. [39] trained both a Bayesian classifier and a long short-term memories
(LSTM) neural network on bytecode instructions to predicate the false positive
warnings. In our work, we train our models on the source code, not on bytecode
instructions, which are simplified and easier to analyze with ML techniques as compared
to the source code. On the other hand, we evaluate which metrics are highly correlated
with each type of warning generated by the SCA tool, while in their work the authors
evaluated which source code structures force the SCA tools to generate false positive
warnings.
Reynolds et al. [40] identified and documented 14 of different kinds of false positive
patterns, by running three of SCA tools against C/C++ Juliet test suite. Then the
authors reduced the source code manually in order to remove the unrelated instructions.
In our work, we run a number of ML techniques and infer which of software engineering
metrics are related to each type of SCA tools’ warnings.
Lastly, Tripp et al. [41] tackled the problem of false-positive warnings by combining
the SCA tool user interaction with ML techniques. For example, users classify some of
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SCA tool warnings into either actionable or spurious. Based on the user input the ML
techniques predict the remaining SCA tool warnings automatically. In our work, we
do not consider user interaction to classify the SCA tool warnings. We will consider
the user interactions in future work.
2.3 Ranking SCA Tools’ Warnings
In this section, we discuss related work on SCA tool warning prioritization methods
either the historical data or statistical analysis techniques.
2.3.1 History-Based Warning Prioritization (HWP)
In this subsection we describe some of the popular history-based warning Prioriti-
zation (HWP) techniques. These techniques rank the SCA tool warnings using the
software change history for warnings removed during bug fixes [30] [42].
Kim and Ernst [30] proposed a history-based warning prioritization algorithm
by mining warning fix experience recorded in the software change histories. The
proposed algorithm was evaluated by running three of SCA tools (FindBugs, JLint,
and PMD) on three programs (Columba, Lucene, and Scarab). The main idea of
this study was if the warnings were eliminated by fix-changes, this indicated that the
warnings were important because they reported a real bug in the software source code.
The experimental results showed that the algorithm improves warning precision by
17%–67%.
Likewise, Ruthruff et al. [43] developed a logistic regression model to predict
and rank whether a generated warning represents a real defect in the given source
code. Screening methodology was used to build an effective model by removing the
factors with low predictive power from the dataset. The authors selected 33 factors to
generate the required models. These factors were extracted from FindBugs warnings
descriptions, Google warning descriptions, file characteristics, source code warning
histories, source code factors, and code churn factors.
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Our technique differs from the above works in that we utilize characteristics derived
from the source code associated with the collected warnings to rank the new warnings.
Because the proposed framework uses the value of the source code metric to rank the
warnings, the proposed framework might be more practical and better at classifying
the SCA tool warnings. Furthermore, The main limitation of the above works is that
they depend on information from software histories, such as warning fix activities.
Also, the software developers’ prior knowledge and practices can reduce the efficiency
of these methods by increasing the likelihood of missing new potential defects that
the developers have not encountered before. Likewise, these methods can be biased
toward the SCA tool warnings that have a similar flavor [44].
To overcome this restriction and to build an unbiased model, we use Juliet test
suite to build our model. Juliet test suite is a set of thousands of small test programs
written in C/C++ to present over 100 classes of a common software weaknesses, such
as deadlock and buffer overflow [45]
2.3.2 Statistical Analysis-Based Ranking
Kremenek and Engler [27] proposed z-ranking, a technique that ranks the warnings
emitted by SCA tools by employing a simple statistical model. The main idea of this
technique is that code containing many successful checks (safe cases analyzed by the
tool) and a small number of warnings, tends to contain a real error.
On the other hand, Yungbum et al. [46] tackled the problem of false positive
warnings by proposing an analyzer called Airac (Array Index Range Analyzer for C),
which collects all the true buffer overrun points in ANSI C programs. This analyzer
uses the Bayesian statistics to compute the probability that a warning indicates a true
defect. Warnings are sorted by the probabilities value.
Likewise, Ribeiro et al. [47] ranks SCA tool warnings during software development,
allowing developers to fix only the true positive warnings. To rank the warnings, the
authors first ran three of open-source SCA tools (CppCheck, Clang Static Analyzer,
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and Frama-C) that supported C/C++ programming language on the source code to
collect the warnings. They then trained a set of decision trees using AdaBoost to
create a stronger classifier using a set of features obtained from the labeled aggregated
warnings, such as tool name, number warnings in the same file, category(buffer,
overflow, etc.), redundancy level, and number of neighbors. Finally, They used
AdaBoost classifier probabilities to rank the warnings as either true positive or false
positive. The experimental results showed that the generated classifier achieved 80%
classification accuracy. This work differs from ours in two principal ways. First, our
work ranks SCA tool warnings using a different of software engineering metrics (source
code metrics); second, our datasets represent some of the most common software
weaknesses, such as CWE-134.
The main limitation of these techniques is that they require a large number of
labeled aggregated warnings to build and train the classifier. Producing these datasets
requires a significant manual effort.
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3. EVALUATION OF STATIC CODE ANALYSIS (SCA)
TOOLS USING SOFTWARE ENGINEERING METRICS
In Chapter 1, we have presented why we need to evaluate the SCA tools and why we
need to generate a number of datasets. In Section 2.1 of Chapter 2, we have already
discussed the related research on evaluating SCA tools. In this chapter, we first
describe the challenges associated with evaluating SCA tools in Section 3.1. Then, we
formally present the Static Code Analysis Tool Evaluator (SCATE) framework, which
is our novel contribution for evaluating SCA tools in term of software engineering
metrics in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 illustrates the Case Study that we use to evaluate
the proposed framework. In Section 3.4, we describe results of applying SCATE to
the selected code base. Finally, we summarize our main contributions in Section 3.5.
3.1 Challenges Addressed by the Proposed Framework
We address several challenges in this chapter, including the following:
• A wide range of SCA tools is available to software developers and companies.
These tools improve source code quality and increase software security by
revealing potential security vulnerabilities early in the software development
process [48]. Therefore, selecting the best tool or set of tools can pose a significant
challenge because manual operation of the tool, as well as manual checking of a
large number of generated reports, is necessary to determine which SCA tools are
suitable for a given source code [15]. Manual SCA tool selection is an extremely
time-consuming and tedious task [7].
• Most current research evaluates the effectiveness of SCA tools by confirming
whether their use improves source code quality and software security. In other
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words, the tool that highlights the largest number of potential defects in the
source code is considered the best. Few current studies, if any, investigate the
effects of how the source code was written on the ability of the SCA tools’ ability
to identify potential defects [49] .
• Not all the SCA tools can identify the same source code weaknesses. Developers
therefore find it difficult to decide which SCA tools are best for their source
code by considering only the total number of uncovered security defects [48] .
To overcome these challenges, we extended the SCATE 1 framework, a framework
for evaluating the quality of static code analysis tools.
3.2 The Approach of SCATE
This section discusses the design of the framework that we have created to evaluate
the quality of SCA tools, which is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The framework is written
in Python, and is designed to be extensible to any SCA tool we want to evaluate either
locally or remotely. The framework is also designed to be extensible to different code
bases used to evaluate an SCA tool. The key entities in the framework are as follows:
• Command. The Command is an interface that defines the different tasks and
operations supported by the framework. Such commands currently include:
parsing the source code; building the knowledge base from a source code base
acting as the test suite; analyzing an SCA tool’s report; and analyzing source
code metrics like code complexity, dependency between the functions, and source
lines of code (SLOC).
• Tool. The Tool is an interface that defines how SCA tool integrates with the
framework. The Tool interface allows the framework to perform several key
1SCATE is an acronym for Static Code Analysis Tool Evaluator.
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Command
<<interface>>
+	name():	string
+	parse_args(args):	void
+	execute():	void
Import
SCATE
(main)
Build Export Report
DataManager
+	write(ResultSet):	void
+	read_datapointset():	void
+	write_datapointset(datapointset):	void
Tool
<<interface>>
+	name():	string
+	correct_checker(bug,weakness):	bool
+	supports_weakness	(weakness):	bool
+	build_result_set(language):	instance
XML	ManagerCSV	Manager
C++	JulietJava	Juliet
Latex	Manager SWAMP	ManagerMetrics	Manager
TestSuite
<<interface>>
+	type(	):	void
+	HandleResultset(	):	void
Preprocessor
<<interface>>
+	read(	):	void
+	execute(	):	void
Preprocessor
Metrics
Undersatnd
Metrics	Manager
SCATool
AbstractSCATool Swamp	Tool<<use>>
Tool1 Tool4Tool2 Tool3 Tool5
RW
Fig. 3.1.: General design of our extensible framework
for evaluating static code analysis tools.
operations offered by SCA tool, such as checking if the SCA tool supports a
specific weakness, and checking if the reported bug has the target type (i.e., the
type of flaw that the test case under testing targets).
• DataManager. The DataManager is used to define the output file format for
each command in this framework. For example, the import command will use
the DataManager to generate the knowledge base of the known flaws from the
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test cases. Likewise, the build command will use the DataManager to read the
SCA tools’ report and convert it into a hierarchical abstraction (see Figure 3.2).
Each SCA tool generates a different format of report which makes the comparison
hard. To solve this problem we use the hierarchical abstraction to normalize the
SCA tool’s report.
ResultSet
-	source
-	weaknesses
-	import
-	build
Weakness
-	name
-	resultSet
-	suites
Suite
-	directory
-	weakness
-	files File
-	filename
-	suite
-	function
-	metrics
Function
-	name
-	file
-	lines
-	metrics
Line
-	line_number
-	function
-	flaw
-	bug
-	metrics
Flaw
-	line
-	severity
-	description
-	source
MetricSet
-	CountInput
-	CountOutput
-	CountPath
-	Knots
-	Cyclomatic_Complexity
-	CountLineCode
Bug
-	line
-	type
-	message
-	source
Fig. 3.2.: Entities that make the knowledge base
for a Test Suite in the framework.
• Preprocessor. The Preprocessor is an interface that allows the framework to
preprocess the source code and complete any information that will be missing
from an SCA tool report, like the name of the function that contains the known
flaws.
• TestSuite. The TestSuite is an interface for integrating different Test Suites
into the framework. The Test Suite is then used by the framework to construct
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a knowledge base (or test oracle) from the code base. The knowledge base is
then used to determine the true positive, false positive, and false negative rate
of an SCA tool for the corresponding TestSuite.
3.2.1 Commands Supported in the Framework
Each command in the framework is responsible for a given task in evaluating the
SCA tools. Currently, we have implemented the following set of commands:
• Import. The import command is used to create a knowledge base from the
source code in a TestSuite. The source code must contain the tags identified
in Table 3.1, which originate from the Juliet test suite, to generate the correct
knowledge base that is comprised of the entities listed in Figure 3.2. However,
we simulated these tags in real-world applications using the information available
at (https://www.cvedetails.com).
Table 3.1.: The different Tags used by the Framework
to correctly label locations of interest.
Tag name Description
POTENTIAL FLAW Indicates a flaw that has the target type and
it appears based on specific conditions.
INCIDENTAL FLAW Indicates a flaw that may be detected, but is
not the main focus of the test case.
FIXED Indicates a place in the source code that orig-
inally had a flaw and is no longer present.
• Build. The build command executes different operations supported by a SCA
tool. This includes executing the SCA tool against the Test Suite either locally
or remotely; extracting results; and building an actionable knowledge base from
the reported bugs.
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• Metric. The metric command is used to compute the different software engineer-
ing metrics for each source file in a Test Suite. The software engineering metrics
are then integrated back into the knowledge base. Currently, we are using the
Understand (https://scitools.com/) tool to generate our software engineering
metrics. Our framework, however, is not limited to only using Understand.
• Export. The export command computes the true positive, false positive, and
false negative rate for the SCA tool by comparing its generated output against
the constructed knowledge base. An output is identified as a true positive when
the SCA tool correctly labels the flaw. The output is identified as a false positive
in three situations: (1) when the SCA tool reports there is a flaw in the source
code, but it really does not; (2) when the SCA tool reports the fix tag in the
good function or in the good class as flaw; and (3) when the SCA tool reports
the flaw tag in the bad function or in the bad class with wrong type. Lastly, an
output is identified as a false negative when the SCA tool does report a known
flaw in a bad function or bad class.
• Report. The report command converts the output from the export command
into a human-readable report.
3.2.2 Integrating With the SWAMP
The SoftWare Assurance Marketrue positivelace (SWAMP) is a cloud environment
for running source code against different static code analysis tools. The SWAMP
provides 19 open-source SCA tool and 4 commercial SCA tools. Its SCA tools support
five programming languages: C/C++, Java, Python, and Ruby. There are two
ways to use the SWAMP. Either use it via their hosted cloud computing platform
(mir-swamp.org), or use the SWAMP-in-a-Box(SiB) open-source distribution [50].
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Integrating our framework with SWAMP allows the developer to evaluate a wide
variety of SCA tools in the context of software engineering metrics. To perform this
integration, we implemented the following two components:
• SWAMPManager. The SWAMPManager reads the SWAMP Common Assess-
ment Result Format (SCARF) files, which is the common format the SWAMP
uses to for reporting the results of an SCA tool, and builds the abstract model
hierarchy (see Figure 3.2) for our framework.
• SWAMPTool. The SWAMPTool acts as a proxy for running SCA tools run
remotely in the SWAMP.
3.2.3 Classifying SCA Tools Output
We faced several challenges when evaluating the quality of SCA tools. For example,
many of the open-source SCA tools do not document the CWEs [51] their checkers
identify, which is the single entity in an SCA tool responsible for identifying a single
problem. This is important because it allows us to correctly identify when an SCA
tool is generating a true positive, false positive, or a false negative. In our work, we
use the following approach to classify an SCA tool error message as a true positive,
false positive, or false negative:
• True positive. We consider an error message to be a true positive if the SCA
tool highlights the predefined flaw of the target type in the correct location. For
example, in the Juliet test suite the reported flaw should be either in the function
or class with the word bad in its name. To better understand the true positive,
Listing 3.1 shows a simplified code snippet from the Juliet test suite that causes
Tool2 to generate a true positive. The code snippet uses the data pointer to
print out the ASCII code of "A" in Hexadecimal using printHexCharLine
function after delete the pointer using delete. Tool2 successfully detected this
flaw [52].
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1 //CWE416_Use_After_Free__new_delete_char_18 . cpp
2 void bad ( ) {
3 char ∗ data ;
4 // I n i t i a l i z e data
5 data = NULL;
6 goto source ;
7 source :
8 data = new char ;
9 ∗data = 'A ' ;
10 //POTENTIAL FLAW: Dele te data in the source
11 // the bad s ink at tempts to use data
12 delete data ;
13 goto s ink ;
14 s ink :
15 //POTENTIAL FLAW: Use o f data t ha t may have
16 //been d e l e t e d
17 printHexCharLine (∗ data ) ; // True Pos i t i v e By Tool
18 //POTENTIAL INCIDENTAL: Pos s i b l e memory l eak
19 // here i f data was not d e l e t e d
20 }
Listing 3.1: True positive example from CWE-416 test case
• False positive. We consider an error message to be an false positive if the SCA
tool highlights a flaw with incorrect type or the fix tag as a flaw. Likewise, the
SCA tool reports a flaw in the source code where in actual there is none. To
better understand the false positives, Listing 3.2 shows a simplified code snippet
from the Juliet test suite that causes Tool1 to generate a false positive. Tool1
generates an Uninitialized dataPtr1 variable, but the source code assign the
memory address of data in line 4 [53].
1 //CWE124_Buffer_Underwrite__char_declare_loop_32 . c
2 void bad ( ) {
3 char ∗ data ;
4 char ∗ ∗dataPtr1 = &data ;
5 char ∗ ∗dataPtr2 = &data ;
6 char dataBuf f e r [ 1 0 0 ] ;
7 memset ( dataBuf fer , 'A ' , 100−1) ;
8 dataBuf fe r [100−1] = ' \o ' ;
9 {
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10 //False Po s i t i v e : Un i n i t i a l i z e d Var iab le .
11 char ∗ data = ∗dataPtr1 ;
12 //Flaw : Set data po in t e r to be f o r e the
13 // a l l o c a t e d memory b u f f e r
14 data = dataBuf fe r − 8 ;
15 ∗dataPtr1 = data ;
16 }
17 }
Listing 3.2: False positive example from CWE-124 test case.
• False negative. If the SCA tool does not identify the flaw for the corresponding
weakness in a function or class that contains the word bad this flaw will be
considered as an false negative. To better understand the false negatives,
Listing 3.3 shows a simplified code snippet from the Juliet test suite that causes
Tool3 to generate a false negative. Tool3 could not highlight the potential flaw
in the source code. This tool did not examine the new value of the data before
executing printLine(100/data) instruction. In other words, bad function
calls bad_source function by passing the reference of data variable, then
bad_source function uses a random function to assign new value to data.
This new value may be zero, so when bad function use this value without
checking if it equals zero a divide-by-zero weakness may be raise [54].
1 //CWE369_Divide_by_Zero__int_rand_divide_43 . cpp
2 stat ic void bad_source ( int &data )
3 {
4 data = RAND32( ) ;
5 }
6
7 void bad ( )
8 {
9 int data ;
10 data = −1;
11 bad_source ( data ) ;
12 //POTENTIAL FLAW: Pos s i b l y d i v i d e by zero
13 p r i n t In tL in e (100 / data ) ;
14 }
Listing 3.3: False negative example from CWE-369 test case.
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3.3 Case Study
In this section the case study that we utilize in order to evaluate the effectiveness
of the proposed framework.
3.3.1 Selected Code Base
In this study, we have used two different types of test suites: the synthesized
(Juliet test suite ) and real-world (Xerces-C++ and Apache Tomcat) source codes to
evaluate the SCA tools.
In the first phase of the evaluation process, we ran each SCA tool against the Juliet
Test Suite for either C++ or Java to evaluate their quality. The Juliet Test Suite was
created by the National Security Agency’s (NSA) Center for Assured Software (CAS) to
evaluate any SCA tools’ ability. The Juliet Test Suite for C++ programming language
contains 61,387 test cases and covers 118 CWEs (Common Weakness Enumeration),
aiming to create a catalog of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities [55]. On the
other hand, the NIST Juliet suite for Java programming language contains 23,957 test
cases and covers 113 CWEs [56]. In the second phase of the evaluation process, we
ran the open-source SCA tools (Tool1, Tool4, and Tool5) against two of real-world
applications, which are listed below:
1. Xerces-C++ (http://xerces.apache.org/xerces-c/). An XML parser framework
written in the C++ programming language; it can parse, generate, and validate
XML documents using the DOM, SAX, and SAX2 APIs. It is one of the most
widely used C++ XML parsers..
2. Apache Tomcat (tomcat.apache.org). An implementation of the Java Servlet [57]
and JavaServer Pages [58] technology. One of the most widely used Java web-
based application servers, Tomcat is embedded in many enterprise application
servers that serve very high volumes of requests.
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Table 3.2 shows important information about the real-world applications used as
case studies in this study to evaluate open-source SCA tools in the context of software
engineering metrics values.
Table 3.2.: Some important information about the
real-world applications used as case study
Name Language Number
of vulner-
abilities
Version CWE
Xerces-C++ C++ 9 3.0.0 476, 20, 119
Apache Tom-
cat
Java 32 9.0.0.M1 22, 254, 284,
434,79
To explore the performance of open-source SCA tools on two of real-world ap-
plications, we determine potential security vulnerabilities and their locations using
the information in the newer version, which has the fixed the vulnerabilities and the
security reports available at the application website. On the other hand, to identify
the type of the actual security vulnerabilities, we used the information available at
(https://www.cvedetails.com) [59].
3.3.2 Selected Static Code Analysis (SCA) Tools
The proposed framework evaluates five SCA tools, which are listed below 2:
• Tool1. An open-source SCA tool for C/C++ code. This tool uses Lexical
Analysis to find the flaws in C++ source code. Lexical Analysis matches the
tokenized source code with a list of checkers and reports if it finds a suspicious
pattern. Ignoring the data flow of the source code causes the Tool1 to not able
to detect vulnerabilities caused by the invalidated external input.
2At the time of writing this dissertation we keep the name of the SCA tools confidential because we
do not have time to discuss the results with the SCA tools’ vendors
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• Tool2. A commercial SCA tool for C/C++ and Java code. This tool analyzes
both the source code and binaries. To find flaws in C++ and Java source code,
Tool2 builds an abstract model from the source code, then explores it with the
symbolic execution engine to test every execution path.
• Tool3. A commercial SCA tool for C/C++, Java, and C# code. This tool
analyzes the source code after building the control flow and data flow. Also,
this tool provides a range of security checkers to detect the potential security
vulnerabilities in the source code. However, Tool3 ranks the uncovered defects
in order to consider only the four most severe levels of warnings to avoid false
positive warnings problem.
• Tool4. An open-source SCA tool for Java code. This tool focuses on finding
bugs or potential performance problems, not style or formatting errors, using a
list of bug patterns and by using data flow analysis for source code. In contrast
to the previous tools, this tool uses byte-code, not source code. The potential
errors reported by Tool4 are classified into four ranks: "scariest" (rank 1-4),
"scary" (rank 5- 9), "troubling" (rank 10-14), and "of concern" (rank 15-20).
These ranks reflect the severity and impact of errors in the software.
• Tool5. An open-source SCA tool for Java and JavaScript code. Tool5 includes
a set of built-in rules in order to detect common programming flaws such as
unused variables, empty catch blocks, and so forth, as well as supporting the
ability to write custom rules. Tool5 includes CPD (Copy-Paste Detector), which
attempts to find the duplicated code in Java, C, C++, PHP, Ruby, FORTRAN,
JavaScript, PLSQL, Python, and other programming languages.
3.3.3 Selected Weaknesses (CWEs)
Although the five SCA tools have been evaluated against 91 CWEs in the test
cases. The results of the following CWEs have been discussed in detail:
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• CWE-369: Divide by Zero. This weakness occurs when an unexpected value
is provided to the product/calculation, or if an error occurs that is not properly
detected [54]. To better understand this weakness, Listing 3.4 shows a simplified
code snippet that contains a function that computes the average of student
grades.
1 //CWE−369_Divide_by_Zero_example
2 f loat compte_avg ( f loat t o ta l , f loat num_grads ) {
3 // //POTENTIAL FLAW
4 return t o t a l /num_grads ;
5 }
Listing 3.4: CWE-369 Example
Without validating the parameter value (num_grads) used as the denominator
is not zero a divide by zero error can be occurred. To avoid this error we just
need to ensure that the input value of the num_grads will be always not zero.
• CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable. This weakness occurs when the
source code uses a variable that has not been initialized. This weakness may lead
to unpredictable or unintended results [60]. To better understand this weakness,
Listing 3.5 shows a simplified code snippet that contains a function that print
out the value of the local variable.
1 //CWE−457_Use_of_Uninitalized_Variable_example
2 void print_out ( ) {
3 double dvalue ;
4 //POTENTIAL FLAW
5 pr intDoubleLine ( dvalue ) ;
6 }
Listing 3.5: CWE-457 Example
The variable dvalue is never assigned any value before using it. The SCA tool
should be able to identify this error as CWE-457 warning message.
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• CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. This weakness occurs when the
application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid, but it is NULL.
This weakness may lead to crash or exit.
1 //CWE−476_NULL_Pointer_Dereference_example
2 void bad ( ) {
3 int ∗ptr = NULL;
4 /∗ Po t en t i a l FLAW: Dereferencing o f the nu l l po in t e r ' p t r ' ∗/
5 i f (∗ ptr == 17)
6 cout << ( " ptr = 17 " ) << endl ;
7 }
Listing 3.6: CWE-476 Example
Listing 3.6 shows that the analyzer has to identify the fragment of code that
uses a null pointer. In the if condition, there is a logical error that leads to
dereferencing of the null pointer. The error may be introduced into the code
during code refactoring or through a misprint [61].
• CWE-382: J2EE Bad Practices: Use of System.exit(). This weakness
occurs when access to a function that can shut down the application by calling
System.exit().
• CWE-484: Omitted Break Statement in Switch. This weakness occurs
when the source code omits a break statement within a switch or similar construct,
causing code associated with multiple conditions to execute. However, when the
software developers intended to execute code associated with one condition this
weakness can cause some problems.
3.3.4 Selected Software Engineering Metrics
The software engineering metrics we used to evaluate the SCA tools are a set of
source code metrics, including Volume, Object-Oriented, and Complexity metrics. To
compute the value of the software engineering metrics from the source code, we ran
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the Understand tool, which is a SCA tool designed to compute the values of most
traditional software engineering metrics for C++ and Java programs. The Understand
tool supports more than 39 software engineering metrics. Moreover, a different number
of techniques can be used to acquire metrics from the source code, either by using the
source code tokens, a data-flow graph, or a control-flow graph. The metrics that were
employed in this work are categorized as below [62]:
1. Basic Count Line Metrics. These metrics retrieve information about each
line in the source code in the scope of a function, a class, or a file. Within this fam-
ily of metrics, we used CountLineBlank, CountLineCode, CountLineComment,
CountLineCodeDecl, CountLineCodeExe, CountLineInactive, and CountLinePre-
processor.
2. Basic Count Metrics. These metrics are divided into two main sets: CountDe-
clClass, which retrieve the number of classes in the file; and, CountDeclFunction,
which retrieve the number of functions declared in the file.
3. Basic Token Metrics. These metrics retrieve information about the source
code complexity. Within this family of metrics, we used Cyclomatic, Cyclomat-
icModified, CyclomaticStrict, Countsemicolon, and MaxNesting.
4. Control Flow Metrics. These metrics are computed from the control flow
graph of the function. Within this family of metrics, we used Knots, Essential,
MinEssentialKnots, MaxEssentialKnots, and CountPaths.
5. Miscellaneous. We used CountInput and CountOutput metric. These metrics
are generally estimated at three levels: project-level, file-level, and function-level.
The software engineering metrics are generally estimated at four levels: project,
class, file, and function. In this work, we estimated the software engineering metrics
at the class, file, and function levels only [62]. However, we will discuss the following
metrics in detail [62]:
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1. Essential Complexity. This metric computes the source code complexity
after iteratively replacing all the well-structured control structures, such as the
if-then-else and while loops, with a single statement. The Essential complexity
is given with the following equation.
Essential = (number_of_jumps_for_each_node_
that_has_multiple_children− 1) + 1
(3.1)
2. Cyclomatic Complexity. This metric computes the source code complexity
by using the McCabe Cyclomatic technique [63], where the complexity of any
structured source code with only one entrance and one exit point is equal to the
number of decision points contained in that source code, plus one.
3. CountPathLog. This metric belongs to the category of Complexity Metrics
and computes the logarithm of the total number of unique paths in the function
by excluding the abnormal exits and the GoTo statements. This software
engineering metric is assessed by the Understand static tool at the function level.
4. CountOutput. This metric belongs to the category of Object-Oriented metrics
and computes the number of outputs of the function in source code. The
outputs may be classified into functions calls, parameters set/modify, and global
variables set/modify. We computed the value of this software engineering metric
at function or method level by running the Understand static tool, which
follows the information approach of the Fan-Out to calculate the value of the
CountOutput metric.
5. CountPath. This metric belongs to the category of Complexity Metrics and
computes the total number of unique and possible paths in the function by ex-
cluding the abnormal exits and the GoTo statements. This software engineering
metric is assessed by the Understand static tool at the function level.
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6. Knots. This metric belongs to the category of Complexity metrics, and is a
measure of overlapping jumps. In the given source code, the Knots value equals
the number of line-crossings that determine where every jump in the flow of
control occurs.
7. MaxNesting. This metric belongs to the category of Complexity Metrics, and
computes the complexity of the given function or method in terms of the level
of the control constructs, such as if, while, for, and switch in the function or
method.
8. CountInput. This metric belongs to the category of Object-Oriented metrics
and computes the number of inputs the function uses. The inputs may be
classified into the function calleby, global variables used in the function, and
the in parameters used in the function. We compute the value of this software
engineering metric at the function or method level by running the Understand
static tool, which follows the information approach of the Fan-In to calculate
the CountInput metric value [62].
9. CyclomaticStrict. This metric computes the source code complexity, which
equals the Cyclomatic Complexity metric with logical ANDs and ORs in the
conditional expressions, and also adds 1 to the complexity for each occurrences.
10. RatioCommentToCode. This metric computes the ratio of the number of
comment lines to the number of code lines in a given source code. In some cases,
the value of this metrics is higher than 100, because some lines in the source
code contains both the code and comments.
11. MinEssentialKnots (MinKnots). This metric reflects the minimum value
of Knots metric that computed after all the structured programming constructs
have been removed from a given source code.
12. CyclomaticModified. This metric computes the source code complexity,
which equals the Cyclomatic Complexity metric except that each decision in a
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multi-decision structure (such as switch) statement is not counted and instead
the entire multi-way decision structure counts as 1.
13. CountStmtExe. This metric counts the number of executable statements in a
given source code. A line in the source code can be executable and declarative,
but a statement must be one or the other (or empty).
14. CountStmtDecl. This metric counts the number of declarative statements in
a given source code.
15. CountStmt. This metric counts the number of declarative plus executable
statements, given with the following equation:
CountStmt = CountStmtDecl + CountStmtExe+ CountStmtEmpty (3.2)
16. CountSemicolon. This metric counts the number of semicolons in a given
source code.
17. CountLineCodeExe. This metric is used to compute the number of lines that
contain executable source code.
18. CountLineInactive. This metric is used to compute the number of lines that
are inactive from the view of the preprocessor.
19. Preprocessor Lines. This metric is used to compute the number of preproces-
sor lines.
20. MaxEssentialKnots (MaxKnots). This metric computes the max value of
the Knots metric after the structure programming constructs have been removed
in the given source code.
21. CountLineComment (aka CLOC). This metric reflects the number of lines
containing a comment. This metric can overlap with other code-counting metrics.
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22. CountLine (aka NL). This metric counts the number of physical lines in a
given source code.
23. CountLineCode (aka LOC, SLOC). This metric reflects the total number
of lines that contain source code, but only in a given function. For classes,
the value of this metric will be the sum of the CountLineCode for the member
functions.
24. CountLineCodeDecl. This metric counts the number of lines containing
declarative source code. A line can be declarative and executable at the same
time.
25. CountLineBlank (aka BLOC). This metric counts the number of blank lines
in a given source code, excluding in inactive regions.
26. CountDeclFunction. This metric reflects the number of functions in the file.
27. AltCountLineBlank. This metric reflects the number of blank lines, including
in inactive regions.
28. AltCountLineComment. This metric counts the number of lines containing
comments, including comments within inactive regions.
29. AltCountLineCode. This metric counts the number of lines containing source
code, including inactive regions.
30. CountDeclClass. This metric counts the number of classes in the file.
31. CountDeclClassMethod. This metric counts the number of static class
methods.
32. CountDeclClassVariable (aka NV). This metric counts the number of class
variables.
33. CountDeclInstanceMethod (aka NIM). This metric counts the number of
instance methods.
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34. CountDeclInstanceVariable (aka NIV). This metric counts the number of
instance variables.
35. CountDeclMethod. This metric counts the number of local (not inherited)
class methods.
36. CountDeclMethodDefault. This metric counts the number of local default
visibility methods.
37. CountDeclMethodPrivate (aka NPM). This metric counts the number of
local (not inherited) private methods.
38. CountDeclMethodProtected. This metric counts the number of local pro-
tected methods.
39. CountDeclMethodPublic (aka NPM). This metric counts the number of
public methods, but only local (not inherited) methods.
3.4 Experimental Evaluation of SCATE
This section discusses our experimental results for evaluating SCA tools in the
context of different software engineering metrics.
3.4.1 Experimental Setup
We used the Juliet test suites to perform our experiments against the SCA tools.
To setup and execute our experiment, we executed the following steps:
• We used the import command to parse the source files in the test suite (Juliet
test suites and real-world applications) and build a knowledge base with the
ground truth. The ground truth contains information about the flaws, such
as function name and line number, labeled in the test cases. In this step, the
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framework parses approximately 61,000 C++ or Java files depending on what
SCA tool we are targeting for evaluation.
• We ran the SCA tools either locally or remotely in the SWAMP against the
source code in the Juliet test suite and real-world applications. We then capture
the generated output of the SCA tool because we need this to evaluate if the
SCA tool is correctly labeling the flaws in the source code.
• Next, we assessed the value of the software engineering metrics for each CWE by
executing Understand against the source code for the corresponding test cases.
• Last, we compared the ground truth with the output generated by the SCA
tool, and assessed the performance of the SCA tool with respect to the different
software engineering metrics.
We applied the steps above against the following SCA tools: an open-source
SCA tool that supports C++ programming language (aka Tool1), two open-source
SCA tools that support Java programming language(aka Tool4 and Tool5), and two
commercial SCA tools that support C++ programming language(aka Tool2 and
Tool3). The proposed framework, however, is not limited to only using these tools.
3.4.2 Experimental Results for SCATE
Although the five SCA tools have been evaluated against 91 CWEs in the test
cases. The results of the following CWEs have been discussed in detail:
• CWE-369: Divide by Zero.
• CWE-382: J2EE Bad Practices: Use of System.exit().
• CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable.
• CWE-484: Omitted Break Statement in Switch.
• CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference.
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Following the behavior of SCA tools based on a set of software engineering metrics
have been discussed in detail.
3.4.2.1 CountOutput (Fan-Out)
Figure 3.3 shows the results of the SCA tools for CWE-369 based on the values
of the CountOutput (Fan-Out) metric. As shown in this figure, Tool3 initially finds
more flaws than the other tools when the value of the CountOutput metric is low.
On the other hand, as the value of the CountOutput metric increases, which means
the functions in the source code have high degree of coupling, Tool3 finds fewer flaws
than Tool2 and the other tools. Likewise, Tool2 finds more flaws than the other tools
when the value of the metric increases. Unfortunately, none of the tools can find any
flaws in the source code when the value of the metric becomes more than six.
Fig. 3.3.: The behavior of SCA tools based
on CountOutput for CWE-369.
However, based on the results shown in Figure 3.3 we can conclude that the SCA
tools cannot understand the source code of function f when there are a large number of
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functions that depend on it or when function f heavily uses global variables. Therefore,
the tools can miss some of the potential defects in the source code. To improve the
ability of the SCA tools the software developers could rewrite their source code to
reduce the coupling degree. For example, they can avoid using the global variables in
their source code.
3.4.2.2 CountInput (Fan-In)
Figure 3.4 illustrates the behavior of the SCA tools for CWE-457 based on the
CountInput. As shown in the figure, the number of uncovered flaws by both Tool2
and Tool3 decrease as the value of the CountInput increases. Tool2 finds more flaws
than Tool3 when the source code has a high degree of Fan-In. In other words, when
the functions in the given source code have a high number of calling functions and
global variables read, Tool2 performs better than Tool3.
Fig. 3.4.: The behavior of SCA tools based
on CountInput for CWE-457.
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However, only Tool2 and Tool3 support this weakness so these tools will generate
a number of warnings which can be either true positives or false positives. Therefore,
we can use these warnings to analyze the behavior of these tools only.
3.4.2.3 Lack of Cohesion in Methods (LCOM/LOCM)
The Understand static tool uses the Chidamber and Kemerer method to compute
the value of the LCOM metric [62]. For our experiments, Understand computed the
value of this software engineering metric at the class level. Figure 3.5 illustrates the
behavior of the SCA tools for CWE-382 based on the LCOM.
Only Tool4 and Tool5 support this weakness so these tools will generate a number
of warnings which can be either true positives or false positives. Thus, we can use
these warnings to analyze the behavior of these tools.
Fig. 3.5.: SCA tools behavior based on
LCOM for CWE-382.
37
As shown in this figure, the number of fake warnings generated by both Tool4 and
Tool5 decrease as the value of the LCOM metric increases. Tool5 generates more false
positive warnings than Tool4 when the class has a high degree of LCOM. In other
words, when the class in the given source code has a low degree of cohesion, Tool4
performs better than Tool5.
Likewise, Figure 3.6 showcases the behavior of the SCA tools for open-source
software project based on the LCOM. From this figure, we can observe that Tool5
does not generate any fake warnings for the given source code. On the other hand,
the number of generated fake warnings by Tool4 increases as the value of the LCOM
metric increases. From these figures, we cannot conclude that Tool4 is better than
Tool5. Likewise, we cannot conclude that Tool5 is better than Tool4. It depends on
the structure of the given source code.
Fig. 3.6.: SCA tools behavior based on
LCOM for Open-Source software
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3.4.2.4 MinEssentialKnots (MinKnots)
Figure 3.7 illustrates the behavior of the SCA tools for CWE-484 based on the
MinEssentialKnots. As shown in this figure, Tool5 generates a large number of false
positive warnings when the given source code has a low number of overlapping jumps
after all the structured programming constructs have been removed. On the other
hand, Tool4 does not emit any false warnings for this weakness. Furthermore, the
number of false positive warnings generated by Tool5 declines as the value of the
MinEssentialKnots metric increases.
Fig. 3.7.: SCA tools behavior based on
MinEssentialKnots for CWE-484
On the other hand, Figure 3.8 showcases the behavior of the SCA tools for Java real-
world application based on the MinEssentialKnots. From this figure, we can observe
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that SCA tools do not behave in the same way when we use the real-world source
code. This can be observed from the number of the false positive warnings generated
by both the SCA tools. In other words, Tool4 does not generate any false positive
warnings for the synthetic source code, while for the real-world source code it reports a
number of false positive warnings when the value of the MinEssentialKnots metric was
less than 13. However, the number of false positive warnings generated by Tool4 and
Tool5 for the real-world application decreases as the value of the MinEssentialKnots
increases. However, the developers can reduce the amount of knots in their source
code by removing the misuse of "break", "continue", "goto", or "return" to improve the
SCA tool performance.
Fig. 3.8.: SCA tools behavior based on
MinEssentialKnots for Open-Source software
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3.4.2.5 CountPath
Figure 3.9 showcases the behavior of Tool13 for CWE-476 based on the value of the
CountPath metric. As shown in this figure, Tool1 finds more flaws when the source
code either does not include any control constructs and decision structures or includes
a low number of unique paths. As the number of paths in the source code increases,
Tool1 cannot find more of the potential flaws.
Fig. 3.9.: SCA tools behavior based on
CountPath for CWE-476
Contrary to Figure 3.9, Figure 3.10 displays that Tool1 finds most of the potential
defects in the real-world source code when the value of the CountPath metric increases.
3 Since, currently, we do not have the license for the commercial SCA tools we decided to use the
only Tool1, which is an open-source tool to compare the behavior of SCA tools using Juliet test suite
and open-source software
41
This can be informed from the number of the true positive warnings for Tool1 when
the value of the CountPath metric is higher than 100. On the other hand, Tool1
misses most of the defects when the source code has a low number of unique paths.
Fig. 3.10.: SCA tools behavior based on
CountPath for Open-Source software
From the above-mentioned results, we can conclude that selecting the best SCA
tool for our source code depends on the structure of the source code and the type of
weakness that we want to uncover. Furthermore, the source code of the Juliet test
suite is relatively simple compared to the source code of the real-world applications in
terms of the number and types of the loops, control structures, and function calls that
used in the real-world applications. This may force the SCA tool that generates a
large number of either true or false positive warnings for the source code in the Juliet
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test suite to not report any fake or true positive warnings for the source code of the
real-world applications.
3.4.3 Threats to Validity
For this framework, the main threat to external validity is most SCA tools do
not have an easily accessible mapping of CWEs to checkers, which we use to classify
the tools’ reported bugs as true positive, false positive, or false negative. This threat
causes many of the reported bugs considered as an false negative not as true positive
and in sometimes increases the number of false positive.
Another threat to validity is that the evaluation performed in this chapter should,
however, be replicated using many other open-source software projects in order to
draw more general conclusions. We investigated the relationship between software
engineering metrics and SCA tool behavior using only two open-source software
projects, which is a relatively small number of projects.
3.5 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we have presented the Static Code Analysis Tool Evaluator
(SCATE), which is a framework to evaluate SCA tools using synthetic source code in
term of software engineering metrics. The following are the key contributions of the
SCATE.
• Providing an extensible framework for evaluating SCA tools;
• Evaluating two commercial SCA tools and three open-source SCA tools in terms
of software engineering metrics (source code metrics) against the Juliet test
suite [55] [56] and real-world applications; and
• Discussing how software engineering metrics (such as Coupling and Cyclomatic
Complexity) impact the true positive, false positive, and false negative rates of
the SCA tools.
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4. CLASSIFICATION OF STATIC CODE ANALYSIS
(SCA) TOOL WARNINGS
In Chapter 1, we have presented why we need to classify the SCA tool warnings.
In Section 2.2 of Chapter 2, we have already discussed the related research on
classification SCA tool warnings. In this chapter, we first describe the challenges
associated with classifying SCA tools in Section 4.1. Then, we formally present the
Static Code Analysis Tool Warnings Classification (SCATWC) framework, which is
our contribution for classifying SCA tool warnings using software engineering metrics
in Section 4.2. Section 4.3 illustrates the Case Study that we use to evaluate the
proposed framework. In Section 4.4, we describe results of applying SCATWC to
Juliet test suite. Finally, we summarize our main contributions in Section 4.5.
4.1 Challenges Addressed by the Proposed Framework
Developing ML prediction model to classify SCA tool warnings and predict future
warnings is challenging. This section presents some of these challenges that we tried
to address. In short, we encountered the following challenges:
• ML techniques have been widely used to build prediction models to classify and
predict SCA tool warnings. To train an ML classifiers, many current studies
have derived a number of features from the meta-data of SCA tools’ warnings,
such as the file name, function name, line number, and total number of warnings
generated for a given function. However, to improve the performance of the
classifier we want to build, we have to use features that actually reflect the
syntax of the source code that forces the SCA tool to generate a true positive,
false positive, or false negative warning. Therefore, using the meta-data of the
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generated warnings to train a classifier will diminish its accuracy since those
features do not truly reflect the source code’s syntax.
• The availability of datasets has always been a constraint in research predicting
SCA tool warnings and reducing false positive warnings. In other words, a
number of professionals are usually hired to manually annotate the warnings
and source code as true positive, false positive, or false negative. Annotating
datasets in this way is considered a time-consuming process and is prone to
inaccurate labeling.
• The main issue in predicting and classifying SCA tool warnings is that the
underlying training dataset suffers from an imbalanced distribution problem, in
that the training set for false positive and false negative warnings (the majority
classes) is far larger than the training set of the true positive warnings (the
minority class). This issue leads the classifier to correctly classify and predict
all of the SCA tool warnings from the majority classes (false positives and false
negatives) but to misclassify most of the SCA tool warnings of the minority
class (true positives) [64] [65].
To overcome these challenges, we proposed the SCATWC 1 framework, a framework
for classifying the warnings of SCA tools.
4.2 The Approach of SCATWC
In order to classify the warnings created by SCA tools based on the software
engineering metrics (i.e., source code metrics) new datasets have been created and a
set of ML techniques have been utilized in the proposed approach. Fig. 4.1 indicates
the overview of our approach. As shown in this figure, our approach includes two
stages.
1SCATWC is an acronym for Static Code Analysis Tool Warnings Classification.
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In the first stage, we generate a number of datasets by analyzing a given source
code in two different ways; first, we compute the software engineering metrics such as
Volume, Complexity, and Object-Oriented Metrics metrics. Second, we extract the
SCA tools’ warnings by utilizing a framework SCATE [7].
In the second stage, we utilize four of the common ML techniques. Our proposed ap-
proach, however, is not limited to only the four ML techniques discussed in this chapter.
SCATE
Framework
Code
Base
Understand Static
Tool
<<use>>
DataSet
Step#1: Data set generation phase
Pre­processing 
Step#2: Learning phase
Model
Training 
Data set
Testing 
Data set
Predicate
create
Results
DataSet
Fig. 4.1.: The overview of the proposed approach.
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4.2.1 Dataset Generation Stage
In order to apply the ML techniques on a given source code, we have to follow a
set of important steps:
1. Extract SCA tools’ warnings. To extract the class values (i.e., true positive,
false positive, and false negative), we use SCATE [7], which is an open-source
framework for evaluating the quality of a SCA tool based on the number of true
positives, false positives, and false negatives it generates. This framework was
extended to evaluate more open-source and commercial SCA tools either by
running them locally or remotely in the SWAMP [50] (see Chapter 3).
The main reason for using this framework in our research, is to run the SCA
tools against Juliet test suite for the C++ language to highlight source code
snippet that causes the SCA tool to:
(a) Uncover the target security flaws in either the bad function or in the bad
class implementation (aka true positive tag),
(b) Report that there is a flaw while in reality there is not one (aka false
positive tag), or
(c) Report that there is no flaw while in reality there is one (aka false negative
tag).
These tags will represent class variable value in the generated dataset. Further-
more, the highlighted source code snippets will be used as inputs to the next
step.
2. Compute software engineering metrics. To extract the most important
attributes, or features, from a given source code, we integrated SCATE with
the Understand tool (https://scitools.com/). Understand is a static analysis
tool focused on source code comprehension, metrics, and standards testing.
We use the Understand tool by executing it against the highlighted source code
snippet from the Juliet test suite to compute different software engineering
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metrics at the function-level. The software engineering metrics (see Section
4.3.6) are then integrated back into the SCA tool report managed by SCATE.
Our proposed approach, however, is not limited to only using the Understand
tool, but is generic in nature.
Figure 4.2 showcases how we extended the design of the SCATE framework to
achieve the dataset generation stage by adding a new command namedDSGenerating
command. The DSGenerating command is used to generate a number of datasets
by comparing and integrated the outputs of the above-mentioned steps.
Command
<<interface>>
+	name():	string
+	parse_args(args):	void
+	execute():	void
Import
SCATE
(main)
Build Export Report
DataManager
+	write(ResultSet):	void
+	read_datapointset():	void
+	write_datapointset(datapointset):	void
Tool
<<interface>>
+	name():	string
+	correct_checker(bug,weakness):	bool
+	supports_weakness	(weakness):	bool
+	build_result_set(language):	instance
XML	ManagerCSV	Manager
C++	JulietJava	Juliet
Latex	Manager SWAMP	ManagerMetrics	Manager
TestSuite
<<interface>>
+	type(	):	void
+	HandleResultset(	):	void
Preprocessor
<<interface>>
+	read(	):	void
+	execute(	):	void
Preprocessor
Metrics
Undersatnd
Metrics	Manager
SCATool
AbstractSCATool Swamp	Tool<<use>>
Tool1 Tool4Tool2 Tool3 Tool5
DS	Manager
DSGenerating
Fig. 4.2.: The new design of SCATE framework
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The output of this stage is a numerical dataset, which corresponds to the contents
of a data matrix, where every column of the matrix represents a particular software
engineering metric. The last column, however, represents a class value (i.e, true positive
(which is represented by 1), false positive (which is represented by 2), and false negative
(which is represented by 3)). Likewise, each row in the matrix corresponds to a given
function in the source code. The dataset is, therefore, a multi-class dataset. However,
in some special cases, when the SCA tool generates only two type of tags, or classes,
the generated dataset will be a binary dataset.
To better understand the structure of the generated dataset, Figure 4.3 shows a
sample dataset that is generated as an Attribute-Relation File Format (ARFF) file.
From Figure 4.3, we can observe that the ARFF file contains two main sections: the
header and the data section. The header section contains the name of the relation (in
our example CWE-762-Tool1); a list of the attributes (software engineering metrics
and whether Tool1 will generate true positive (1), false positive (2), or false negative
(3) warning), and their types. In the data section, each line represents a function in a
given source code, and each line contains both the values of the software engineering
metrics for that function and what the warning Tool1 generated.
4.2.2 Learning Stage
The main goal of this stage is to build a classifier (i.e., statistical model) by
applying a set of ML techniques to the datasets generated in Stage 1 (see Section
4.2.1). The classifier is then used to predict a classification value for unknown source
files. Another important goal of this stage is to learn which software engineering
metrics are correlated with true positive, false positive, and false negative warnings
generated by a SCA tool. This stage includes three phases:
1. Preprocessing. The generated dataset contains a set of data points representing
a function that will cause the SCA tool to generate a true positive, false positive,
or false negative message. The data points are represented by a collection of
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Fig. 4.3.: Dataset sample of Tool1 warnings for CWE-762
software engineering metrics that measure a function’s complexity, coupling,
function’s cohesion, and other metrics. Unfortunately, a SCA tool can generate
more than one warnings (i.e., false positive, false negative, and true positive) for
the same function. This can result in contradicting data points in the generated
datasets. To address this problem, we remove the contradicting data points as
Hernández et al. [66] suggest.
2. Model Learning. This phase involves constructing a classifier by using the
training dataset and by examining four of the ML techniques: Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [67], K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) [68], RF [69], and Repeated
Incremental Pruning to Produce Error Reduction (RIPPER) [70].
3. Prediction. The generated classifiers (from the model Learning phase) are
used to predict whether a function in unknown source code will cause a SCA
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tool to generate a true positive, false positive, or false negative message based
on the value of software engineering metrics for the corresponding function.
4.3 Case Study
We use the following case study to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
approach.
4.3.1 Selected Machine Learning (ML) Techniques
In this section, we briefly discuss the ML techniques used in this chapter.
4.3.1.1 Feature Selection
In this work, feature selection is important because it filters redundant and the
inefficient software engineering metrics. We use the Correlation-based Feature Selection
(CFS) technique [71] [72] to identify the most significant software engineering metrics.
The CFS technique searches all the combinations of the software engineering metrics
to find the best combination of the metrics [71].
The CFS technique evaluates the correlation between the software engineering
metrics and the class. The selected software engineering metrics are highly correlated
with the class and less correlated amongst themselves. To do that, the CFS technique
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uses the Pearson coefficient [73], where a high value, or correlation, indicates the best
combination of software engineering metrics.
4.3.1.2 Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE)
SCA tools generate a large number of false positive and false negative warnings,
which results in generating datasets that have a disproportionate ratio of true positive,
false positive, and false negative warnings, or classes. This problem is known as
unbalanced data [65]. To solve this problem and enhance the classifier’s ability, we
used the SMOTE technique [74] to balance the training dataset.
The SMOTE technique balances the binary dataset (in our case: CWE-252-Tool2
and CWE-457-Tool2 see Section 4.4.1) by adjusting the class distribution of a dataset.
We apply the SMOTE on our multi-class datasets by following the strategy, proposed
by Fernandez et al. [75], in two steps. First, we use the binarization schemes, such
as one versus one (OVO), to transform the multi-class dataset into a set of binary
datasets.
Second, we apply the SMOTE approach on each binary dataset to solve the
imbalance problem. However, using the oversampling technique, such as SMOTE, to
balance the datasets may cause overfitting problem. To overcome this problem, we
use the cross-validation technique [76].
4.3.1.3 Classification Techniques
We selected four kinds of classification techniques for our work: instance-based
learning, ensemble learning, rule-based learning, and statistical learning. The tech-
niques are used as benchmarking algorithms to learn and predict the SCA tools warning
for a given source code based on its corresponding software engineering metrics.
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We also selected ML techniques that have successfully been used in the software
defect detection field [77] [78]. We used the Weka Machine Learning workbench
(https://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/) and Scikit-learn Machine Learning li-
brary (https://scikit-learn.org/stable/) to train and test the selected ML tech-
niques. Table 4.1 presents the summary of the four ML techniques we used in the
work.
Table 4.1.: Description of ML Techniques Used in Work
ML Technique Description
K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) It is an instance-based learning algorithm that generalizes
the training data when the time comes to predict a new
data point rather than when the training dataset is
processed [68].
Support Vector Machine
(SVM)
It is developed from statistical learning to build a su-
pervised learning model from either binary datasets or
multi-class datasets. In this work, for the multi-class
datasets, we use OVO and binary SVM technique to
predict the SCA tool warning [67].
Random Forest (RF) It is an ensemble learning method that constructs a series
of unpruned classification trees from bootstrap functions
and software engineering metrics of the training dataset.
The predicted SCA tool warning is determined using the
majority vote as a decision rule [69].
Repeated Incremental Prun-
ing to Produce Error Reduc-
tion (RIPPER)
It is a rule induction algorithm that generates the initial
set of rules for the minority class using incrementally
reduced error. These rules must cover all the functions
of that class. Afterward, the algorithm fills up to the
next class and repeats the same steps until all the classes
have been covered [70].
4.3.2 Selected SCA Tools
We used an open source and a commercial tool for evaluating our work. Since
most source code in the Juliet test suite is written in C/C++ and Java, we selected
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tools that supported at least one of these two languages. The selected SCA tools are
listed below 2:
1. Tool1. An open-source SCA tool that uses Lexical analysis to find the flaws in
C++ source code. Lexical analysis matches the tokenized source code with a
list of checkers, and reports if it finds a suspicious pattern. (See section 3.3.2).
2. Tool2. A commercial SCA tool that analyzes both the source code and binaries.
To find the flaws in C++ and Java source code, Tool2 builds an abstract model
from the source code and then the symbolic execution engine explores the
source code to test every execution path and the variables to find the flaws (See
section 3.3.2).
We selected an open-source SCA tool because it is freely available and can be
used as a base case in order to compare it with a commercial SCA tool. On the other
hand, we selected a commercial SCA tool because the commercial tools are usually
considered to be more trustworthy than the open-source tools [79].
4.3.3 Selected Code Base
We run each SCA tool against the Juliet test suite for C++ to generate the
true positive, false positive, and false negative warnings. The NIST Juliet suite
contains 61,387 test cases covers 118 CWEs, which aim to create a catalog of software
weaknesses and vulnerabilities [55] (see Section 3.3.1).
4.3.4 Selected Weaknesses (CWEs)
In this work, we focus on the following CWEs as they have a bigger dataset for
SCA tools’ warnings when compared to the other weaknesses (see Section 4.4.1) [51],
However, the proposed approach is not restricted to a specific number or type of
CWEs:
2For privacy reasons, we do not disclose the names of the SCA tools.
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1. CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value. This weakness occurs when the
software does not check the return value from the function. This weakness may
lead to prevent the software from detecting unexpected states and conditions.
To better understand this weakness, Listing 4.1 shows a simplified code snippet
that contains a function that prints out the value of data.
1 //CWE−252_Unchecked_Return_Value_example
2 void bad_code ( ) {
3 char dataBuf f e r [ 1 0 0 ] = " " ;
4 char ∗ data = dataBuf fe r ;
5 p r in tL ine ( " Please ente r a s t r i n g : " ) ;
6 //POTENTIAL FLAW
7 f g e t s ( data , 100 , s td in ) ;
8 p r in tL ine ( data ) ;
9 }
Listing 4.1: CWE-252 Example
Without validating the return value of the (fgets) function an unchecked return
value flaw can be occurred. To avoid this flaw we just need to ensure that the
return value of the fgets function will be always not Null.
2. CWE-369: Divide by Zero. There are two reasons for this weakness; first
one is when an unexpected value is provided to the product. The second reason
is, if an error occurs that is not properly detected (See section 3.3.3).
3. CWE-415: Double Free. This weakness occurs when the product calls free()
twice on the same memory address. This weakness may lead to modification of
unexpected memory locations. To better understand this weakness, Listing 4.2
shows a simplified code snippet that initialize data pointer and then freeing the
memory.
1 //CWE−415_Double_Free_example
2 void bad_code ( ) {
3 char ∗ data ;
4 data = NULL;
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5 data = (char ∗) mal loc (100∗ s izeof (char ) ) ;
6 f r e e ( data ) ;
7 /∗ POTENTIAL FLAW: Pos s i b l y f r e e i n g memory twice ∗/
8 f r e e ( data ) ;
9 }
Listing 4.2: CWE-415 Example
There is a potential flaw in line 8 because the data pointer may free the memory
twice.
4. CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable. This weakness occurs when the
source code uses a variable that has not been initialized. This weakness may
lead to unpredictable or unintended results (See section 3.3.3).
5. CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path. This weakness occurs when the software
looks out for critical resources using an externally-supplied search path that
can point to resources that are not under the application’s direct control. To
better understand this weakness, Listing 4.3 shows a simplified code snippet that
contains a function that use the POPEN function, which call opens a process
by creating a pipe, forking, and invoking the shell. It does this by executing the
command specified by the incoming string function parameter. It creates a pipe
between the calling program and the executed command, and returns a pointer
to a stream that can be used to write to the pipe.
1 //CWE−426_Untrusted_Search_Path_example
2 #define BAD_OS_COMMAND " l s −l a "
3 void bad_code ( ) {
4 {
5 char ∗ data ;
6 char dataBuf f e r [ 1 0 0 ] = " " ;
7 data = dataBuf fe r ;
8 i f ( g l oba lF ive==5)
9 {
10 /∗ FLAW: the f u l l path i s not s p e c i f i e d ∗/
11 s t r cpy ( data , BAD_OS_COMMAND) ;
12 }
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13 {
14 FILE ∗pipe ;
15 /∗ POTENTIAL FLAW: Executing the popen () func t i on wi thout
↪→ s p e c i f y i n g the f u l l path to the e x e cu t a b l e
16 ∗ can a l l ow an a t t a c k e r to run t h e i r own program ∗/
17 pipe = POPEN( data , "wb" ) ;
18 i f ( p ipe != NULL)
19 {
20 PCLOSE( pipe ) ;
21 }
22 }
23 }
24 }
Listing 4.3: CWE-426 Example
SCA tool must highlight the potential defects in line 11 and line 17.
6. CWE-762: Mismatched Memory Management Routines. This weakness
occurs when the application attempts to return a memory resource to the system,
but it calls a release function [80].
1 //CWE−762_Mismatched_Memory_Management_Routines_example
2 void bad_code (char ∗ n) {
3 char ∗ empname = (char ∗) c a l l o c ( s t r l e n (n) + 1 , s izeof (char ) ) ;
4 s t r cpy (empname , n) ;
5 //POTENTIAL FLAW
6 delete empname ;
7 }
Listing 4.4: CWE-762 Example
In this example, the function allocates an empname using calloc, however, the
function uses delete function to deallocate empname instead of using free(). The
SCA tool should be able to detect this defect as a CWE-762 warning message.
7. CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference. This weakness occurs when the
application dereferences a pointer that it expects to be valid, but it is NULL.
This weakness may lead to crash or exit (See section 3.3.3).
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SCA tools may be able to correctly detect these CWEs, and might also report a
set of false positive and false negative warnings, which reduces the usability of the
SCA tools. Likewise, going through all the false positive warnings manually, in order
to check if the SCA tool correctly detects a real weakness in the source code, will
consume a lot of developer time.
4.3.5 Selected Performance Evaluation Metric
We have carefully selected a suitable performance measure that examines the
strength and the predictive ability of the developed models. SCA tools generate a
large number of false positive and false negative warnings and the generated datasets
have a disproportionate ratio of the true positive, false positive, and false negative
classes. This problem is known as unbalanced data. In such a case, when we create a
classification model, we will get a high accuracy metric value (such as 90%).
But, this accuracy value is only reflecting the underlying class distribution. This
problem is called accuracy paradox. For this reason, it is better to avoid using accuracy
as the metric to assess the performance of the prediction models [81]. The precision
and recall are commonly used as a performance measure in an unbalanced dataset
problem [82]. However, there is a trade-off between the precision and recall. Thus it
is, therefore, better to use the F1-score, which selects the best model based on the
balance between the precision and recall, as a performance measure for our comparative
needs.
4.3.6 Selected Software Engineering Metrics
As indicated earlier, we compute the source code metrics using the Understand
tool at the function-level. We do this because we are interested in predicting the
behavior of a SCA tool based on how the given function was written not how the whole
file was written. For this reason, twenty-one software engineering metrics, which are
supported by the Understand tool, are selected to generate the datasets. The selected
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software engineering metrics are listed below, Section 3.3.4 shows a brief description
for these metrics.
1. CountInput (Fan-In).
2. CountOutput (Fan-Out).
3. Knots.
4. CountLineCode.
5. CountLineCodeExe.
6. CountPath.
7. Essential.
8. Cyclomatic.
9. CyclomaticStrict.
10. CyclomaticModified.
11. MaxNesting.
12. MinEssentialKnots.
13. MaxEssentialKnots.
14. RatioCommentToCode.
15. AltCountLineBlank.
16. CountLineBlank (BLOC).
17. CountLineCodeDecl.
18. CountLineComment (CLOC).
19. CountLineInactive.
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20. Preprocessor Lines.
21. CountDeclFunction.
However, our proposed approach is not restricted to the selected CWEs or SCA
tools. Furthermore, we believe that the proposed approach can work for multiple SCA
tools and for different weakness types.
4.4 Experimental Evaluation of SCATWC
This section evaluates the effectiveness of the selected ML techniques. This section
also analyzes their performance using the F1-score.
4.4.1 Experimental Setup
In all the experiments, we have adopted a 10-fold cross-validation as a validation
method to address the overfitting problem and to obtain a realistic insight about the
prediction of the model. In 10-fold cross-validation, the dataset is randomly divided
into 10 folds—each one containing the 10% of the data points of the dataset. This
means that nine folds were used for training and one fold was used for testing. This
procedure is repeated ten times and the final performance value for each ML model is
averaged [76].
Table 4.2 summarizes the properties of the generated datasets that we used in our
experiments. This table shows the number of data points, the number of features, and
the number of classes for each dataset. A majority of the datasets used in this work
have either two classes (i.e., true positive and false positive) or three classes (i.e., true
positive, false positive, and false negative).
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Table 4.2.: Summary Description of the data sets
Data set #DataPoints #Features #Classes
CWE-369-Tool1 1836 21 3
CWE-476-Tool1 805 21 3
CWE-762-Tool1 7277 21 3
CWE-252-Tool2 1263 21 2
CWE-369-Tool2 11186 21 3
CWE-415-Tool2 10388 21 3
CWE-426-Tool2 1064 21 3
CWE-457-Tool2 9165 21 2
4.4.2 Experimental Results for SCATWC
4.4.3 CFS Results Analysis
For our research, we are interested in building a classifier model that can predict
the SCA tool warnings for a given function, but we also interested in finding which
of the software engineering metrics are highly correlated with the true positive, false
positive, and false negative warnings.
Table 4.3 shows the relevant software engineering metrics that we identified in
each dataset after applying CFS to it. Each of these subsets has the highest merit
value among 221 other subsets.
To select the best software engineering metrics subset with the highest merit value,
the CFS technique uses the Best First Search algorithm [83] to select the software
engineering metrics that are highly correlated with the warning type, and they are
uncorrelated with each other at the same time.
In this work, to run the CFS technique, we utilized all the features in the generated
datasets. In other words, we ran the CFS technique to compute the merit value by
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investigating all the software engineering metrics that have either positive, negative,
or zero correlation values.
On the other hand, we can observe from this table that the most frequent selected
software engineering metrics among the eight datasets were CountInput, Knots,
CountOutput, CountPath, Cyclomatic, and Essential.
Table 4.3.: Relevant Software Engineering Metrics
Dataset Software Engineering Metrics Merit
CWE-369-Tool1 CountOutput, CountPath, Knots, Cyclomatic, and
CountInput
0.45
CWE-476-Tool1 CountInput, CountLineCode, CountPath, and
MaxEssentialKnots
0.45
CWE-762-Tool1 CountPath, Knots,CountInput, and MinEssential-
Knots
0.73
CWE-252-Tool2 CountInput, Knots, Cyclomatic, CyclomaticStrict,
and Essential
0.78
CWE-369-Tool2 CountInput, Knots, CountOutput, CountLineCode,
Essential,and CountPath
0.32
CWE-415-Tool2 CountInput, Knots, CountOutput, Essential, and
CountPath
0.31
CWE-426-Tool2 CountInput, Knots, Cyclomatic, Essential, Count-
Path, and CountDeclFunction
0.40
CWE-457-Tool2 CountInput, Knots, Cyclomatic, and MaxNesting 0.55
4.4.4 Discussion of Results
Table 4.4 presents the F1-score for the eight datasets and four classification
techniques after using CFS to select the most important software engineering metrics.
As shown in this table, we can observe that the RF technique is better than the other
ML techniques at predicting the functions that force the SCA tools to emit either the
true positive, false positive, or false negative warnings.
For example, for the CWE-369-Tool1 dataset, the RF can correctly predict 94% of
the given functions which warnings the SCA tool will emit, while the RIPPER can
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correctly predict 92% of these functions. Likewise, KNN and SVM predict correctly
87% and 70% what warnings the given function will force the SCA tool to emit.
Table 4.4.: Experimental Results Based on F1-score metric.
Dataset SVM KNN Random Forest RIPPER
CWE-369-Tool1 70% 87% 94% 92%
CWE-476-Tool1 58% 76% 83% 81%
CWE-762-Tool1 76% 81% 87% 83%
CWE-252-Tool2 84% 85% 87% 86%
CWE-369-Tool2 72% 86% 91% 87%
CWE-415-Tool2 83% 87% 94% 92%
CWE-426-Tool2 67% 83% 89% 87%
CWE-457-Tool2 93% 94% 98% 95%
The results show that predicted models generated using the RF and RIPPER
techniques have F1-score greater than 80% corresponding to most of the datasets. On
the other hand, the predicted models that generated using SVM technique have a low
value of F1-score among the multi-class datasets. However, SVM technique has a high
F1-score (i.e., larger than 80%) among the binary datasets.
The F1-score of the RF models were between 83% - 98% in the eight datasets. The
results show that the RF is better than the other ML techniques. It also demonstrates
that the RF is the most effective in SCA tool warnings prediction. One reason that
the RF technique has better performance is that the RF technique works especially
well on large datasets [84] such as CWE-415-Tool2. Another reason is that the CFS
selects the optimal subset of software engineering metrics and passes them to RF.
This means RF uses the optimal subset of software engineering metrics—giving it a
better F1-score score in classifying the SCA tool warnings.
The SVM technique was not able to do well in one dataset of the Tool1 (CWE-
476-Tool1), where the F1-score value is only 58%. This is because the SVM technique
was not able to make an accurate prediction of the SCA tool warnings on the basis of
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only the Volume (e.g., CountDeclFunction and CountLineCode) and Object-Oriented
metrics (e.g., CountInput).
4.4.5 RIPPER Results Analysis
As shown in the experimental results, the RIPPER comes in second place after the
RF in achieving high predicting performance. In this section, we display an example
of the RIPPER rules learned from the CWE-426-Tool2 dataset, and how we try to
interpret these rules. Fig. 4.4 shows sample rules for the Tool2, which are as follows:
1) CountInput >= 2 && CountPath >= 2
   True-Positive-Alter
2) CountInput >= 2 && Essential >= 1
&& Essential <= 2  True-Positive-Alter
3) CountInput >= 2 && Knots <= 0  True-Positive-Alter
5) Knots >= 0 
4) CountDeclFun <= 1 && Essential >= 1  Fasle-Negative-Alter
Fasle-Negative-Alter
6) Fasle-Positive-Alter
Fig. 4.4.: CWE-426-Tool2 Datase Sample of Rules.
1. If the given source code (function) has a Fan-In value larger than or equal 2
(which means that the total number of parameters and global variables that are
used in the function is greater than or equal to 2), and also the given function
has at least 2 unique paths, then Tool2 can find the existing security flaw in the
given function.
2. If the given source code (function) has a Fan-In value larger than or equal 2
(which means that the total number of parameters and global variables that are
used in the function is greater than or equal to 2), and also the given function
has a complexity larger than or equal to 1 and less than or equal to 2 after all
the control-flow structures are replaced with a single statement, then Tool2 can
find the existing security flaw in the given function.
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3. If the given source code (function) has a Fan-In value larger than or equal 2
(which means that the total number of parameters and global variables that are
used in the function is greater than or equal to 2), and also the given function
complexity (Knots) equals zero, then Tool2 can find the existing security flaw in
the given function.
4. If the number of the function in the given source code equals one and the given
source code has a complexity at least 1 after all the control-flow structures are
replaced with a single statement, then Tool2 cannot find the existing security
flaw in the given function.
5. If the number of the overlapping jumps (i.e., for the corresponding source code,
Knots equals to the number of crossing of the lines that determine where every
jump in the flow of control occurs) in the given source code(function) larger than
zero, then Tool2 cannot find the existing security flaw in the given function.
Lastly, if there exists a data point, or source code, that does not meet the conditions
of the previous rules, then the prediction model assigns the majority class in the
dataset, which is a false positive warning. In other words, the prediction model
assumes that the Tool2 will report that there is a security flaw in the given source
code, while in reality there is no one.
From the previous rules, we can conclude that Tool2 can find the defect, or the
flaw, in the given function that has a high degree of Fan-In. On the other hand, the
ability of the Tool2 in finding the defects in the given function will be reduced when
the source code has a high degree of complexity. In this situation, we can infer that
the value of the software engineering metrics for the given function affects on the
ability of the SCA tool in finding the potential defects in the source code.
Fig. 4.5 shows sample rules for the Tool1, which are as follows:
1. If the given source code (function) has a Fan-In value lower than or equal 2
(which means that the total number of parameters and global variables that
are used in function is less than or equal to 2), on the other hand, if the given
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1)    (CountOutput   <=   1). and  (CountPath >= 1 ) 
       and (CountPath. <=  3) and (CountInput  <= 2).
        
True-Positive-Alter
2) (Cyclomatic >= 5 ) and (Knots <= 0)     True-Positive-Alter
3) (CountOutput >= 2) and (Knots <= 6) 
     and (Knots >= 1)    
False-Positive-Alter
False-Negative-Alter4)
Fig. 4.5.: CWE-369-Tool1 Dataset Sample of Rules.
function has a Fan-Out value less than or equal to 1. Likewise, if the given
function has at most 3 unique paths then the Tool1 can find the existing security
flaw in the given function.
2. If the number of crossing of the lines that determine where every jump in the
flow of control occurs in the given function equal zero. Also, if the complexity
of the given function larger than or equal 5, then Tool1 can find the existing
security flaw in the given function.
3. If the given function has a Fan-Out value larger than or equal 2, and the Knots
metric value ranges from 1 to 6, then Tool1 will generate a fake warning.
If there exists a data point, or function, that does not meet the conditions of the
previous rules the prediction model assigns the majority class in the dataset, which is
a false negative warning. In other words, the prediction model assumes that the Tool1
will not report that there is a security flaw in the given source code when in reality
there is one.
From the previous rules, we can conclude that Tool1 can find the defect in the
given function if it has a low degree of coupling (Fan-In and Fan-Out). On the other
hand, Tool1 will generate a false warning when the given function has a high degree
of Fan-Out. In this situation, we can infer that the value of the software engineering
metrics for the given function affects the ability of the SCA tool in finding the potential
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defects in the source code. For example, Tool2 cannot highlight the potential defects
when the given source code has a high degree of Knots.
Due to a large number of decision trees that the RF technique builds for each
dataset (i.e., for the first dataset in Table 4.2 the RF technique creates more than 50
decision trees.), we cannot list and describe the results for each developed model by
the RF technique.
4.4.6 Threat to Validity
For this work, the threats to validity are related to the software engineering metrics
computed by Understand. In most of the software engineering tools, the metrics
are computed either at a file or at a function level. We have computed metrics at
the function level, which leads results in generating contradictory data points in the
datasets.
Another threat to validity is the generalization of the results of the proposed
approach. We have analyzed 7,508 test cases from the Juliet test suite for C/C++,
which may not truly represent real-world source code.
4.5 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we have presented the Static Code Analysis Tool Warnings Classi-
fication (SCATWC), which is a framework to rank SCA tool warnings using software
engineering metrics. The following are the key contributions of the SCATWC.
• Showing how we use ML and data mining techniques along with a collection of
software engineering metrics to predict if the source code will lead the SCA tool
to emit either true positive, false positive, or false negative warnings; and
• Evaluating which of software engineering metrics are highly correlated with the
true positive, false positive, and false negative warnings generated by a SCA
tool.
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5. RANKING STATIC CODE ANALYSIS (SCA) TOOL
WARNINGS
In Chapter 4, we proved that we can use the RF model to classify the generated SCA
tools’ warnings for Juliet test suite into either true positive, false positive, or false
negative. So, in this chapter, we transfer the RF model that trained using Juliet test
suite to classify and rank the SCA tools’ warnings generated for the real-world source
code (open-source software projects). In Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, we have already
discussed the related research on ranking SCA tool’s warnings. We first describe the
challenges associated with ranking SCA tool’s warnings generated from the real-world
source code in Section 5.1. Next, we present a motivate example in section 5.2. Then,
we formally present the Static Code Analysis Tool’s Warnings Ranking (SCATWR),
which is our novel contribution for ranking warnings and reducing the number of
generated fake warnings in efficient way in Section 5.3. In Section 5.5, we describe
results of applying SCATWR to different open-source software applications. Finally,
we summarize our main contributions in Section 5.6.
5.1 Challenges Addressed by the Proposed Approach
The main limitation of ranking SCA tool warnings is that it is impossible to build
and train accurate prediction models for some of the software projects; the software
projects either do not have enough developmental historical information (historical
data) or have too little historical data. For example, not all software developers
maintain a clear list of historical bug information or assemble a set of adequate
information from the previous versions of their software. Another example, can be
seen when the software developers intend to rank the SCA tool warnings for the first
release of a software, which has no historical data. The historical data of the software
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project was used in current studies to label the generated warnings into true positives
or false positives. Then this warnings were used to create a training set to build
prediction model.
This model can be used later to predict and rank the future warnings for the
new open-source project software release or for the warnings that generated after the
current source code was changed to add new functionality or correct some security
defect. To address this challenge, plenty of current studies attempt to use the following
strategies:
• Gathering warnings for various kinds of open-source software projects to generate
a training dataset. The main drawback of this strategy is that it needs human
effort to label a large number of warnings and these efforts are too expensive.
• Utilizing another prediction model that trained on another open-source project
or synthetic source code to rank the warnings of the target software without
retraining the model. Unfortunately, this strategy will harm the predictive
performance of the prediction model and may lead to the generation of an
inaccurate ranking list of warnings.
To solve these challenges, we proposed the Static Code Analysis Tool’s Warnings
Ranking (SCATWR) framework, which utilizes one of the most common domain
adaptation techniques to rank SCA tool warnings. However, first, we will show a
simple example to explain the importance of the proposed framework.
5.2 Motivating Example
To demonstrate the importance of reducing false positive warnings, we provide the
following concrete example. Table 5.1 summarizes the outputs of one of the SCA tools
that run over the Juliet test suite. The output shows the number and percentages of
true and false positives reported by the tool.
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Table 5.1.: Emitted Warnings for SCA tool on Juliet test suite
CWE-ID #TP #FP Warnings Percent of FP Percent of TP
CWE-126 496 5348 5844 92% 8%
CWE-134 576 16918 17494 96% 4%
From this table, we can observe that 92% and 96% of the emitted warnings were
false positives. If we suppose that each warning requires three minutes for manual
inspection. The time that the developers need to inspect the emitted warnings for
CWE-126 would take 12.18 workdays as to four minutes using our framework. The
proposed framework, therefore, can save the developers’ time by guiding the software
developers toward the most serious warnings only.
5.3 The Approach of SCATWR
This section discusses the design and implementation of the Static Code Analysis
Tool Warnings Ranking (SCATWR). The main goal of the SCATWR is to prioritize
the warnings reported by the SCA tools for both open-source and synthetic source
code using the value of source code metrics computed by the Understand static tool.
Figure 5.1 gives an overview of the SCATWR. From this figure, we can observe that
the SCATWR framework design is divided into the four main phases, listed below.
5.3.1 Phase #1: Generate Datasets for the Synthetic Source Code
The first phase in the proposed framework was to generate a number of datasets
that represent the important characteristics of the functions that forced the SCA tool
to emit the warning. Later in this chapter, these datasets were used to train a classifier
to rank the warnings as either true or false positives. The input of this phase is the
C/C++ Juliet test suite. To generate the datasets we performed the following steps:
1. Collected the SCA tool warnings by running a SCATE framework, which evalu-
ates the quality of the SCA tools in terms of source code metrics [49] [7].
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2. Computed the value of software engineering metrics for the labeled source code
by running the Understand static tool ( https://scitools.com). Where the
value of source code metrics was computed at the function level.
3. Last, created a binary dataset for each CWE. Where the value of the dependent
variable (class/label) in the generated dataset is either true or false positive.
Furthermore, this dataset was considered as a labeled source domain. For more
details see Section 4.2.1
5.3.2 Phase #2: Generate Datasets for the Open-Source Software
In this phase, fourteen of open-source software programs were used in order to
evaluate the proposed framework. To do that, we created a number of datasets to
represent the source code of the open-source software projects that forced the SCA
tool to generate the warnings by performing the following steps:
1. Collected the SCA tool warnings by running a SCATE framework after extending
this framework to evaluate the SCA tools using some open-source software.
2. Computed the value of software engineering metrics for the labeled source code
by running the Understand static tool. As in the previous phase, the value of
software engineering metrics was computed at the function level.
3. Last, created an unlabeled dataset for each CWE. This dataset was considered
as a target domain.
5.3.3 Phase #3: Compute Score of the SCA Tool Warnings
To rank the SCA tool warnings, we first used the RF algorithm to build a strong
classifier by creating a forest with a number of weak decision trees. Using the RF
algorithm allowed us to overcome the over-fitting problem [85]. In order to train this
72
classifier, we used the generated datasets from Phase #1. Next, the trained classifier
was used to predict the label value for each warning aggregated from the open-source
software (output of Phase #2).
However, the output of Phase #2 (aka target domain), in some experiments that
we did later in this work, was randomly divided into two parts (validation set and
testing set). The validation set was labeled using the Active Learning (AL) technique,
where the instances with the highest entropy value were sent to the professional
(oracle) to correctly label them (see Section 5.3.4). Then this validation set was used
as labeled target domain to improve the performance of the trained RF classifier. On
the other hand, the testing set was used in most of the experiments to evaluate the
performance of the proposed approach.
Finally, we used the probabilistic value computed for each warning by using the
optimal RF classifier as a confidence rate, in order to rank the warnings as either true
or false positive. Based on the confidence rate, the warnings were reordered in a list,
where the warnings with the higher confidence rate were at the top of the list and the
warnings with the lower confidence rate were at the bottom.
5.3.4 Phase #4: Check the List of Rankings
In the last phase of the proposed framework, both the validation set and the ranked
list of warnings were sent to professionals to label the validation set correctly and
to check the correctness of the ranked list. Based on the professional feedback the
training dataset was updated by using the ranked list and the validation set in order
to generalize the RF classifier.
In this manner, we mitigated the cost of the manual inspection process for the
false positive warnings by forcing the coders and the developers to inspect only the
warnings at the top of the ranked list and to ignore the warnings at the bottom. In
other words, software developers will omit only the warnings that have a confidence
rate below a given threshold.
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5.4 Case Study
We use the following case study to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed
framework.
5.4.1 Selected Code Base
In this work, we evaluated the proposed framework using two different kinds of
source code as a test cases.
5.4.1.1 NIST Juliet test suite
We ran the SCA tool against the Juliet test suite for C++ to generate the warnings
messages. Juliet test suite contains 61,387 test cases covering 118 CWEs and aims to
create a catalog of software weaknesses and vulnerabilities [55] [45] (see Section 3.3.1).
5.4.1.2 Open-Source Software
We used fourteen open-source software projects written in C++. As shown in
Table 5.2, we selected a wide range of open-source projects. For example, we had
projects that we consider small in size (e.g., App2 and App5) and projects we consider
large in size (e.g., App7 and App10). We also have projects we consider to be mature
by their version number (e.g., App4). Table 5.2 shows some important information
about the open-source software projects used to evaluate the proposed framework 1.
1For privacy reasons, we do not disclose the names of the open-source software projects
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Table 5.2.: Open-source software information
App Name Version Language SLOC Number of files Size
App1 3.0.0 C/C++ 425682 918 38.6 M
App2 2.14 C/C++ 76877 918 7.3M
App3 1.0.1e C/C++ 361381 2203 6.7M
App4 9.2.4 C/C++ 650097 5458 38M
App5 1.7.0 C/C++ 80676 412 2.3M
App6 1.8.3 C/C++ 967716 1728 12M
App7 1.10.2 C/C++ 2333668 5109 34M
App8 1.2.2 C/C++ 615317 3478 93M
App9 2.8.8 C/C++ 736084 6117 35M
App10 1.8.0 C/C++ 2538702 3279 32M
App11 1.0.0 C/C++ 95676 623 3.4 M
App12 0.26.0 C/C++ 80680 502 31.2 M
App13 1.0.0 C/C++ 76977 765 70.3 M
App14 3.0.0 C/C++ 160195 918 38M
5.4.2 Selected Weaknesses (CWEs)
We used the following Common Weakness Enumerations (CWEs) to investigate
the effectiveness of our framework.
1. CWE-126: Buffer Over-Read. This weakness occurs when the pointer or
its index is incremented to a position beyond the bounds of the buffer or when
pointer arithmetic results in a position outside of the valid memory location to
name a few. This may result in exposure of sensitive information or possibly a
crash [86]. To better understand this weakness, Listing 5.1 shows a simplified
code snippet that contains a function that print out the value of the dest
variable.
1 //CWE−126_Buffer_Overread_example
2 #include <wchar . h>
3
4 void bad_code ( ) {
5 wchar_t data [ 1 5 0 ] , des t [ 1 0 0 ] ;
75
6 /∗ I n i t i a l i z e data ∗/
7 wmemset( data , L 'A ' , 149) ;
8 data [ 1 4 9 ] = L ' \0 ' ;
9 wcsncpy ( dest , data , 99) ;
10 /∗ Po t en t i a l FLAW: do not e x p l i c i t l y n u l l
11 terminate de s t a f t e r the use o f wcsncpy () ∗/
12 printWLine ( des t ) ;
13 }
Listing 5.1: CWE-126 Example
In this example, since the number of characters that being copied to the dest
is lower than the size of the data; wcsncpy function will not explicitly null
terminal dest. So, SCA tool should be able to identify the potential flaw that
may occur when using printWLine function to print out the value of dest as
CWE-126 warning message.
2. CWE-134: Use of Externally-Controlled Format String. This weakness
occurs when the function has a format string as one of its arguments, and this
format string constructs from an external source. This may result in denial of
service or data representation problems [87]. To better understand this weakness,
Listing 5.2
1 //CWE−134_Use_of_Externally_Controlled_Format_String_example
2 #include <s td i o . h>
3 #include <s t r i n g . h>
4 #include <s t d l i b . h>
5
6 void main ( int argc , char ∗∗ argv ) {
7 char buf [ 1 0 0 ] ;
8 int x = 1 ;
9 s np r i n t f ( buf , s izeof buf , argv [ 1 ] ) ;
10 buf [ s izeof buf −1 ] = 0 ;
11 // Po t en t i a l Flaw
12 p r i n t f ( " Buf f e r s i z e i s : (%d) \nData input : %s \n" , s t r l e n ( buf )
↪→ , buf ) ;
13 p r i n t f ( "X equa l s : %d/ in hex : %#x\nMemory address f o r x : (%p) \n"
↪→ , x , x , &x ) ;
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14 }
Listing 5.2: CWE-134 Example
Now, If the code snippet received the string "John %x %x" as input the format
function snprintf parses the input string and the output will be the name John
and the contents of the memory address [88].
We selected these CWEs because they have a bigger dataset for SCA tool warnings
when compared to the other weaknesses (see Section 5.5.2). Although, we are using
the CWEs mentioned above for our work, the proposed framework is not limited to a
specific number or type of CWE. The challenge for us, however, is finding datasets
that contain enough warnings for a CWE to validate the proposed framework.
5.4.3 Selected Static Code Analysis (SCA) Tools
We used one open-source SCA tool (Tool6) to evaluate our work. Tool6 supports
C/C++ programming language. The selected SCA tool is a quite simple tool. This
tool examines C/C++ source code and reports any possible security vulnerabilities
sorted by risk level.
Tool6 uncovers many common software weaknesses, such as buffer overflow risks,
format string problems, and race conditions, using a built-in database of dangerous
C/C++ constructions. We selected an open-source tool because it is freely available.
On the other hand, we chose Tool6 from a long list of open-source tools because it
supports the most common software weaknesses, such as CWEs.
5.4.4 Selected Software Engineering Metrics
To rank SCA tool warnings, 21 of source code metrics were computed at a function
level for the given source code. These metrics were categorized into three main
groups. Table 5.3 shows a brief description of these groups for more information see
Section 3.3.4 and 4.3.6.
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Table 5.3.: Description of Source Code Metrics [62]
Source Code Metric Description
Complexity Metrics Compute the complexity of a given function.
For example, Knots metric reflects the struc-
tural complexity of a given source code by
measuring the overlapping jumps.
From this group we used Knots, Essential, Cy-
clomatic, CyclomaticStrict, CyclomaticModi-
fied, MaxNesting, CountPath, MaxEssential-
Knots, and MinEssentialKnots.
Volume Metrics Reflect the number of line in a given source
code that satisfies some conditions. For exam-
ple, CountLineCode metric reflects the total
number of lines that contain source code only
in a given function.
From this group we used CountLineCode,
CountLineCodeExe, RatioCommentToCode,
AltCountLineBlank, CountLineBlank, Count-
LineCodeDecl, CountLineComment, Count-
LineInactive, Preprocessor Lines, and Count-
DeclFunction.
Object-Oriented Metrics Compute the coupling for a given function.
For example, CountInput metric Computes
the Fan-In for given source code.
From this group we used CountInput and
CountOutput.
5.4.5 Selected Machine Learning (ML) Technique
In Chapter 4, we demonstrated that we can use source code metrics to classify
warnings generated by two SCA tools (open-source and commercial tools) as a true
positive, false positive, or false negative warnings.
Likewise, the experimental results show that the classifier generated by RF tech-
nique outperformed the other classifiers generated by the other ML techniques. For
this reason, we decided to use RF to rank the SCA tool warnings as either true positive
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or false positive. The RF classifier is an ensemble classifier that produces multiple
decision trees using a randomly selected subset of training samples and variables [85].
5.4.6 Selected Performance Metric
We used F1-score [89] to evaluate the performance of the classifier used in our
framework [90]. We selected F1-score because the generated datasets from both NIST
Juliet test suite and the open-source software suffer from an imbalance issue.
We, therefore, cannot use the accuracy metric, which measures the number of
correct predictions made by the model over all kinds of predictions made [90], to
measure classifier performance. F1-score provides the weighted average of the precision
and recall—where an F1-score reaches its best value at 1 and the worst value at 0.
The relative contribution of precision and recall to the F1-score are equal. F1-score is
given with the following equation.
F1− score = 2 ∗ (precision ∗ recall)(precision+ recall) (5.1)
5.4.7 Selected Domain Adaptation (DA) Technique
Traditional ML techniques work well when both the training and testing datasets are
drawn from the same feature space and the same distribution. When the distribution
changes, most statistical methods need to be rebuilt from scratch using newly collected
training data.
To solve this problem Transform Learning (TL) suggests applying the knowledge
that learned previously(from the source domain) to solve new problems (target domain)
faster or with better solutions [91]. In the following subsections, we briefly review
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some basics of notations and concepts that are usually used in the domain adaptation
field.
5.4.7.1 Problem Settings
Given the labeled functions in the source domain as DS = {(xs1, ys1), ..., (xsns, ysns} =
{XS, yS} and the unlabeled functions in the target domain asDT,U = {(xt,u1 ), ..., (xt,unt,u} =
{XT,U}. Sometimes, we may also have a small amount of labeled data from the target
domain as DT,L = {(xt,l1 , yt,l1 ), ..., (xt,lnt,l, yt,lnt,l} = {XT,L, yT,L}. Moreover, the entries in
yS and yT,L denote their corresponding labels(1 (true positive warning) and 2(false
positive warning)).
Therefore, our proposed framework aims at predicting the label value for the
unlabeled target domain using the source domain and the labeled data from the target
domain by building the optimal model that minimizes the expected loss with respect
to the true distribution P (X, Y ).
In general, there is two main distributional difference between the source and target
domains, namely, Instance difference and labeling difference. The difference between
the source and target domains may come from the difference between the marginal
distribution. In another word, Ps(X) 6= Pt(X) but Ps(Y |X) = Pt(Y |X). This problem
can be referred to as a covariate shift [92] [93] or sample selection bias [94].
On the other hand, the difference between the source and target domains may come
from the difference between the conditional probability distribution. In another word,
Ps(Y |X) 6= Pt(Y |X) but Ps(X) = Pt(X). This problem can be referred to as labeling
difference. In order to discover if our datasets (Juliet test suite and open-source
software projects) have labeling difference, we need first to label some of instances
from the target domain.
If label the target domain instances is a time-consuming and costly process in
this situation we have to assume that there is no labeling difference between the
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source and target domains. To solve the above problems we used instance weighting
technique [95] [96]. The main goal of this technique is to assign instance-dependent
weights to the loss function when minimizing the expected loss over the data distribu-
tion [95] [96].
To find the optimal prediction model for target domain from a pool of models we
should find the model that will minimize the expected loss with respect to the joint
distribution P (X, Y ).
f ∗ = argmin
f∈H
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
P (x, y)L(x, y, f) (5.2)
Where f ∗ is the optimal model and L(x, y, f) is a loss function. To find the optimal
model for the target domain (open-source software projects), we follow the approach
proposed by Jiang [96].
5.4.7.2 Instance Weighting Technique
Instance-based transfer learning techniques is considered as one of the common TL
technique that can be used to solve the domain adaptation problem. Instance-based
transfer learning assumes that certain parts of the data in the source domain can be
reused for learning in the target domain by re-weighting.
There are two major techniques can be used to re-weight source domain instances:
instance re-weighting and importance sampling. In this research we used the framework
proposed by Jiang [97] to remove the misleading warnings in the Juliet test suite
datasets, re-weight the Juliet test suite warnings to simulate the unlabeled open-source
software projects’ warnings, and finally, use a small set of labeled warnings from the
open-source software project’s warnings to improve the predictive capability of the
ML model.
The proposed weighting framework suggest using three datasets: labeled source
(Ds), labeled target (Dt,l), and unlabeled target domains (Dt,u). First source domain
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instances were used to approximate the expected loss in the target domain using the
following formula [97].
f ∗t = argmin
f∈H
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Pt(x, y)
Ps(x, y)
Ps(x, y)L(x, y, f) (5.3)
≈ argmin
f∈H
Ns∑
i=1
Pt(xsi )
Ps(xsi )
Pt(ysi |xsi )
Ps(ysi |xsi )
L(xsi , ysi , f) (5.4)
= argmin
f∈H
Ns∑
i=1
αiβiL(xsi , ysi , f) (5.5)
Second, the labeled target domain instances only were utilized to approximate the
expected loss in the target domain using the following formula.
f ∗t = argmin
f∈H
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Pt(x, y)L(x, y, f) (5.6)
≈ argmin
f∈H
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
P˜t(x, y)L(x, y, f) (5.7)
= argmin
f∈H
Nt,l∑
i=1
L(xt,li , y
t,l
i , f) (5.8)
Third, the unlabeled target domain instances could be used to find the optimal
learning model for the target domain using the following formula.
f ∗t = argmin
f∈H
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
Pt(x)Pt(y|x)L(x, y, f) (5.9)
≈ argmin
f∈H
∑
(x,y)∈X×Y
P˜t(x)Pt(y|x)L(x, y, f) (5.10)
= argmin
f∈H
Nt,u∑
i=1
∑
y∈Y
Pt(y|xt,ui )L(xt,ui , y, f) (5.11)
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= argmin
f∈H
Nt,u∑
i=1
∑
y∈Y
γi(y)L(xt,ui , y, f) (5.12)
Finally, all the previous formulas were combined into a single objective function.
As shown below.
ft = argmin
f∈H
[
λs
Ns∑
i=1
αiβiL(xsi , ysi , f) + λt,l
Nt,l∑
i=1
L(xt,li , y
t,l
i , f)
+λt,u
Nt,u∑
i=1
∑
y∈Y
γi(y)L(xt,ui , y, f) + λR(f)
] (5.13)
The last formula ( 5.13) was employed in this work in order to approximately find
the optimal learning model for the target domain. We selected this technique because
it has successfully been used in the Natural Processing Language (NPL) field [98].
5.5 Experimental Evaluation of SCATWR
In this section, we present and discuss the experimental results obtained with the
proposed framework.
5.5.1 Experimental Setup
To setup and execute our experiment, we executed the following steps:
1. We selected the SCA tool that involves CWEs in its rules.
2. We selected the code base to generate SCA tool warnings. The code base includes
Juliet test suite and open-source software.
3. We ran SCA tool against the source code in both the Juliet test suite and the
open-source software. We then capture the emitted warnings of the SCA tool
because we need this to generate a number of datasets.
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4. We assessed the value of the software engineering metrics for each CWE by
executing Understand static tool against the source code for the corresponding
test cases in Juliet and open-source software.
5. We used scikit-learn, which is a free software machine learning library for the
Python programming language to train the RF classifier over the emitted datasets
from the Juliet test suite.
6. We classified and ranked the open-source software warnings as true or false
positives using the trained RF classifier after transfer it using instance weighting
technique;
7. We computed the threshold for the false positive warnings for each CWE.
8. We created the warnings ranked list by comparing the probability value for each
warning with the threshold.
9. Last, we asked the professional to review and check the ranked list of warnings.
5.5.2 Dataset Statistics
To evaluate the proposed framework we generate four of datasets from the Juliet
test suite and open-source software projects. Table 5.4 summarizes the properties of
the emitted datasets that we used in our experiments. This table shows the number of
data points (warnings), the number of features (source code metrics), and the number
of classes for each dataset. A majority of the datasets used in this chapter have two
classes (i.e., true positive and false positive).
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Table 5.4.: Summary Description of the datasets
Dataset Name Data Points Features Classes
CWE-126-Tool6-open-source 1200 21 2
CWE-134-Tool6-open-source 351 21 2
CWE-126-Tool6-Juliet 5844 21 2
CWE-134-Tool6-Juliet 17494 21 2
5.5.3 Experimental Results
Since the false positive warnings reduction approach proposed in this work heavily
depends on the confidence value computed by the RF Classifier, we perform a set of
experiments to select the optimal classifier, which will transfer the knowledge from the
source domain (Juliet test suite) to the target domain (open-source software projects).
The setting and result for each experiment are listed below.
5.5.3.1 Experiment #1: Using a Source Baseline Model for Ranking
In Chapter 4, we demonstrated that the RF classifier is well suited for predicting
and classifying SCA tool warnings across a wide range of synthetic test cases. In this
experiment, an RF classifier has been trained using only the warnings aggregated
from the Juliet test suite to accurately rank the open-world software warnings. This
classifier will be considered as a source baseline model for our work.
Figure 5.2 showcases the steps that we followed to train and test the effectiveness
of the source baseline model. This figure depicts our attempt to explore the efficiency
of the source baseline model by directly applying the supervised learning model (RF)
trained using Ds without weighing the source domain instances for the target domain.
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Fig. 5.2.: Using Source Baseline Model to Rank
Open-World Software Warnings
In other words, we used this model to directly obtain a classifier for the target domain
utilizing the following formula.
ft = argmin
f∈H
Ns∑
i=1
L(xsi , ysi , f) (5.14)
By analyzing the source baseline model results given in Figure 5.3, we can make
the following observations:
• The source baseline model is not appropriate to predict or rank the warnings of
the open-source software. This can be inferred from the value of the F1-score
for the CWE-134-open-source and CWE-126-open-source datasets.
• Since the Juliet test suite is a synthetic source code, the source code will be
relatively simple compared to the source code of the open-source software projects.
In other words, the number and type of the loops, control structure and function
calls used in the open-source software projects differ from those used in the
Juliet test suite. This difference causes the software engineering metrics to have
a varying range of values that may be larger or smaller than Juliet test suite
metrics. Likewise, this difference leads the proposed framework to generate
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Fig. 5.3.: Source Baseline Model Results
training and testing datasets that are drawn from different distributions, which
decreases the performance of the source baseline model.
From these observations, we can conclude that the source baseline model will not
be the optimal classifier to rank the SCA tool warnings. Therefore, we need to perform
another experiment with different settings and datasets.
5.5.3.2 Experiment #2: Using a Target Baseline Model for Ranking
As seen in the previous experiment, using only the Juliet test suite warnings only
to train the RF classifier and then directly predict the open-source software project
warnings led the classifier to perform badly. So, in this experiment, instead of using
Juliet test suite warnings to train the classifier, we used a subset of the open-source
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software project warnings after labeling them using the AL technique. Therefore,
formula ( 5.6) was used in this experiment.
Labeled
warnings
Open-Source
Projects
Unlabeled
warnings
Target Baseline
Classifier
Test
Train
Results
Fig. 5.4.: Using a Target Baseline Model to Rank
Open-World Software Warnings
Figure 5.4 showcases the steps that we followed to train and test the effectiveness
of the target baseline model. This figure depicts our attempts to explore the efficiency
of the target baseline model by directly applying the supervised learning model (RF)
trained using Dt,l without considering the source domain instances (Juliet test suite
warnings) for the unlabeled target domain (open-source software project warnings of
unknown type).
However, by analyzing the target baseline model results that are given in Figures 5.5
and 5.6, we can make the following observations:
• The target baseline model is an appropriate to predict or rank the warnings of
the open-source software. This can be inferred from the value of the F1-score
for CWE-134-Tool6-open-source and CWE-126-Tool6-open-source datasets.
• Increasing the number of labeled warnings from the target domain to train the
model can improve the performance of the model and enhance the correctness of
the open-source warnings list. This is because more warnings in the validation
set or the labeled target domain mean that the approximate distribution will be
better.
88
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 24 48 72 96 120 144 168
Target Baseline Model -- CWE-126
F1
-sc
or
e
Size of validation set
Fig. 5.5.: Target Baseline Model Results
for CWE-126
From these observations, we can conclude that the target baseline model can be
an optimal classifier to rank SCA tool warnings if we have enough labeled warnings
from the open-source software projects to start the AL technique. Unfortunately,
as we mentioned before, we cannot depend solely on the labeled target domain to
train the classifier because some software projects do not have any historical data or
bug lists to build a training dataset. On the other hand, depending on humans to
label some target domain warnings may generate training datasets with mislabeled
warnings. Therefore, we need to perform another experiment to explore whether the
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Fig. 5.6.: Target Baseline Model Results
for CWE-134
performance of the classifier will be improved when we use both the labeled warnings
from the open-source software projects and the warnings from the Juliet test suite.
5.5.3.3 Experiment #3: Using a Baseline Model Trained Over Ds and Dt,l
Figure 5.7 displays the steps that we followed in this experiment to train the RF
classifier and test it with the unlabeled open-source software projects. From this
figure, we can observe that we did not reweigh any Juliet test suite warnings to train
the model. In other words, all the Juliet test suite warnings equally collaborated to
extract the important pattern from the source code of the Juliet test suite, such as
the number of unique paths that the source code could use to achieve specific tasks.
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Likewise, we utilized some of the labeled open-source warnings to train the model. In
this experiment we utilized the following formula to build the RF classifier.
ft = argmin
f∈H
Ns+t,l∑
i=1
L(xi, yi, f) (5.15)
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Fig. 5.7.: Using a Baseline Model Trained Over Ds and Dt,l
to Rank Open-Source Software Warnings
However, by analyzing the model results that are given in Figures 5.8 and 5.9, we
can make the following observations:
• The RF classifier trained using both the SCA tool warnings that aggregated
from a synthetic source code and the warnings collected from some open-source
software projects is appropriate to predict or rank the rest of the warnings from
the other open-source software projects. This can be inferred from the values
of the F1-score for the CWE-134-Tool6-open-source and CWE-126-Tool6-open-
source datasets.
• Using a labeled target domain to train the RF classifier helps the model to learn
new patterns appearing in the target domain warnings (open-source software
projects) only. These patterns do not exist in the dataset that generated using
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Fig. 5.8.: Result of Baseline Model Trained
Over Ds and Dt,l for CWE-126
the Juliet test suite, as the real-world source code structure, which could increase
the complexity of the source code and make it difficult for SCA tool to understand
and analyze the source code to determine the potential defects.
• Again, increasing the number of labeled warnings from the target domain to
train the model can improve the performance of the model and enhance the
correctness of the open-source warnings list. This is because more warnings
in the validation set or labeled target domain means that the approximate
distribution will be better.
• Last, using warnings from synthetic source code such as Juliet test suite can
reduce the likelihood of having some of the mislabeling warnings in the training
dataset, because usually synthetic test cases were built to evaluate the SCA tools
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Fig. 5.9.: Result of Baseline Model Trained
Over Ds and Dt,l for CWE-134
by adding some annotation to the source code in order to determine the type
and the location of the potential defects in the source code. These annotations
help us to correctly label the SCA tool warnings, which improve the performance
of the classifier.
Building the RF classifier in this experiment depends on the availability of pro-
fessional or a large number of open-source software labeled warnings. However, in
some domains, it is very difficult to construct a large labeled dataset due to the costly
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annotation. This can be considered as a major limitation for this experiment, which
the next experiment was intended to overcome.
5.5.3.4 Experiment #4: Baseline Model Trained Using α and Juliet Suite
Figure 5.10 summarizes the steps that we followed in this experiment to train
the RF classifier using the Juliet test suite warnings reweighed by α value. In this
experiment, we used the α to reduce the feature distribution divergence between the
Juliet test suite and open-source software warnings.
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Fig. 5.10.: Using a Baseline Model Trained Using α and Juliet Test Suite
to Rank Open-Source Software Warnings
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To compute the value of α, we used both the unlabeled open-source software
projects and the logistic regression method proposed by Zadrozny [94] by rewriting
Pt(x)
Ps(x) as follows.
Pt(x)
Ps(x)
= P (x|d = t)
P (x|d = s)
= P (d = t|x)P (x)
P (d = t) .
P (d = s)
P (d = s|x)P (x)
= P (d = s)
P (d = t) .
P (d = t|x)
P (d = s|x)
∝ P (d = t|x)
P (d = s|x)
(5.16)
Where d denotes either the source (Juliet test suite) or target (open-source software
projects) domain. To find the value of P (d = t|x) and of the P (d = s|x), we built a
logistic regression model as follows.
P (d = t|x) = 11 + exp(−θTx)
P (d = s|x) = 1− P (d = t|x)
= 11 + exp(θTx)
(5.17)
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To learn the logistic regression (θ), we considered the Juliet test suite warnings
as belonging to one class and the open-source software warnings as belonging to the
other class. The value of αi was be computed as follows [97].
α′i =
P (d = t|xsi ; θ)
P (d = s|xsi ; θ)
= 1 + exp(θ
Txsi )
1 + exp(−θTxsi )
C =
Ns∑
i=1
α′i
αi =
Ns
C
α′i
(5.18)
On the other hand, we set λs = 1, λt,l = 0,and λt,u = 0. The final formula that we
used in this experiment is listed below.
f ∗t = argmin
f∈H
Ns∑
i=1
αiL(xsi , ysi , f) (5.19)
However, by analyzing the model results given in Figure 5.11, we can make the
following observations:
• The RF classifier trained using only the SCA tool warnings that aggregated from
a synthetic source code, having the highest weight and ignoring the Juliet test
suite warnings of low weight outperform the baseline model trained using only
Juliet test suite warnings. Unfortunately, F1-score was lower than 20%. Thus,
we cannot use this model to reduce the SCA tool’s false positive warnings. This
can be inferred from the values of the F1-score for CWE-134-Tool6-open-source
and CWE-126-Tool6-open-source datasets.
• From our experimental results, we can conclude that the Juliet test suite warn-
ings may have few or no labeled warnings representing the open-source software
warnings located in the dense regions. This decreases the RF classifier perfor-
mance.
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Fig. 5.11.: Result of a Baseline Model Trained
Using α and the Juliet Test Suite
In the next experiments, we did not consider α approach to build the RF classifier
due to the low value of the F1-score. In the next experiment, we investigated the
effect of β in weighing the Juliet test suite warnings.
5.5.3.5 Experiment #5: Baseline Model Trained Using β and Juliet Suit
As shown in Figure 5.12, we used β only to weight the source domain instances.
Therefore, to compute the value of the β, we need to compute the value of Ps(ysi |xsi )
from the source domain. Likewise, we utilized the labeled target domain instances to
compute the value of Pt(ysi |xsi ).
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Fig. 5.12.: Using a Baseline Model Trained Using β and the Juliet Test Suite to Rank
Open-Source Software Warnings
In another words, a logistic regression model was learned from the labeled target
domain to compute Pt(Y |X) as follows.
θt = argmin
θt
[
−
Nt,l∑
i=1
lnP (yt,li |xt,li , θt) + λ ‖θt‖2
]
(5.20)
To compute P (y|x, θt), we used the following formula.
P (y|x, θt) =
exp(θTt,yx)∑
y′∈Y exp(θTt,y′x)
(5.21)
Next, the trained model was used to estimate Pt(ysi |xsi ) as follows.
Pt(ysi |xsi ) ≈ P (ysi |xsi , θt)
=
exp(θTt,ysix
s
i )∑
y′∈Y exp(θTt,y′xsi )
(5.22)
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Finally, the value of the βi can be computed as follows.
β′i =
P (ysi |xsi , θt)
P (ysi |xsi , θs)
C =
Ns∑
i=1
β′i
βi =
β′i
C
(5.23)
Lastly, we set λs = 1, λt,l = 0,and λt,u = 0. So, the final formula looks like below.
f ∗t = argmin
f∈H
Ns∑
i=1
βiL(xsi , ysi , f) (5.24)
Furthermore, only the weighted source domain instances were used to train the
RF classifier.
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Fig. 5.13.: Evaluate the Performance of the Source Baseline Model,
Baseline Model with β, and Baseline Model with α for CWE-126
From Figures 5.14 and 5.13, we can conclude that the β approach outperforms
the baseline model and the α approach. On the other hand, increasing the number
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Fig. 5.14.: Evaluate the Performance of the Source Baseline Model,
Baseline Model with β, and Baseline Model with α for CWE-134
of labeled warnings from the target domain can improve the performance of the β
approach due to the need for the labeled target warnings to compute the value of
the β. From these observations, we can infer that the difference between the Juliet
test suite warnings and open-source software project warnings comes more from the
difference in the conditional distribution. In the next experiment, we explored the
effect of using both β and the labeled target domain to train the RF classifier and
check whether this setting will improve the classifier performance.
5.5.3.6 Experiment #6: Baseline Model Trained Over Ds and Dt,l Using β
In most of the previous experiments, the value of λs was set to 1 and the value
of λt,l was set to 0. In this experiment, the value of both λs and λt,l was set to 1
and the value of λt,u set to 0. In other worlds, we used the labeled warning from the
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open-source software projects to estimate β to weight the Juliet test suite warnings.
Then, we combined the weighted warnings with the labeled open-source software
project warnings to train RF classifier.
Labeled
warnings
Juliet test
suite (Source
Domain)
Labeled
warnings
Baseline
Classifier
Test
Results
Open-Source
Projects
(Target
Domain)
Training
Unlabeled
warnings
Open-Source
Projects
(Target
Domain)
Training
Dataset
Compute Beta
value
Fig. 5.15.: Using a Baseline Model Trained Using β,
Ds, and Dt,l to Rank Open-Source Software Warnings
The formula that we used in this experiment ia as follows [97].
ft = argmin
f∈H
[
λs
Ns∑
i=1
βiL(xsi , ysi , f) + λt,l
Nt,l∑
i=1
L(xt,li , y
t,l
i , f)
]
(5.25)
From Figures 5.16 and 5.17, we can conclude that re-weighting the Juliet test suite
warnings using β and utilizing the labeled target domain warnings to train the RF
classifier will outperform the other proposed models even when the validation dataset
is small (has only 24 warnings).
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and Baseline Model Trained Over Ds and Dt,l using
β for CWE-126
Based on the observations from our experiments, we can conclude that using the
β to re-weight the Juliet test suite warnings and the labeled open-source software
warnings to train an optimal RF classifier outperforms the other proposed setting,
even though the difference between the target and source domains come from the
conditional distribution. Therefore, we used this model as an optimal classifier to
rank the false positive warnings aggregated from the real-world applications in the
next sections.
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5.5.4 Discussion
This section discusses our experimental results for ranking SCA tool warnings in
terms of different software engineering metrics.
5.5.5 Most Important Software Engineering Metrics
For our research, we are interested in building a framework that can rank the SCA
tool warnings for a given function using a classifier model, but we also interested
in finding which of the software engineering metrics are highly correlated with the
true and false positives. Figure 5.18 and 5.19 show the relevant software engineering
metrics that we identified in each open-source dataset. The most frequent selected
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software engineering metrics among the two datasets were: CountLineComment,
CountLineCode, CountLineCodeExe, CountLineCodeDecl, CountInput, CountOutput,
and Cyclomatic Strict.
Figure 5.18 showcases the most important software engineering metrics for the
dataset called CWE-126-Tool6-open-source. From this figure we can observe that
the most influenced software engineering metrics for classification and ranking the
CWE-126 false warnings were the Complexity metrics (MaxNesting, Cyclomatic,
and CountPath). Likewise, the some Coupling and Volume metrics (CountInput,
CountLineInactive, CountOutput, and CountLineBlank) take a second place in impact
on classification warnings.
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Fig. 5.18.: Important Software Engineering Metrics for
CWE-126-Tool6-open-source
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Figure 5.19 showcases the most important software engineering metrics for the
dataset called CWE-134-Tool6-open-source. From this figure we can observe that the
most influenced software engineering metrics for classification and ranking the CWE-
134 false warnings were the Volume metrics (AltCountLineBlank, CountLineComment,
CountLineBlank, and RatioCommentToCode). Likewise, the c]Complexity and Cou-
pling metrics (Essential, MaxNesting, and CountInput) take a second place in impact
on classification warnings.
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Fig. 5.19.: Important Software Engineering Metrics for
CWE-134-Tool6-open-source.
From Figure 5.19 and Figure 5.18, we cannot determine what is the set of the
most frequent selected software engineering metrics among the two datasets. In other
words, there is no particular type of software engineering metrics that will be highly
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correlated with the Tool6 warnings across the two CWEs. It depends on what CWE
is under investigation and the structure of the source code.
5.5.6 Reorder Warnings
To rank the emitted warnings from the open-source software, we use the probability
computed by the optimal RF classifier. The probability value determines if the warning
represents a potential defect in the given source code based on a specific type (e.g.,
buffer over-read). The warnings that have probability value greater than threshold for
a specific type of warnings such as CWE-126 is considered as true positives, while the
warnings that have probability value less than or equal threshold is considered as false
positives. This threshold was computed from the training datasets. Table 5.5 presents
the threshold that we used in this work.
Table 5.5.: Threshold for each CWEs
Dataset Name Threshold
CWE-126-Tool6-open-source 0.45
CWE-134-Tool6-open-source 0.36
To evaluate the proposed framework we follow the methodology presented by
Heckman and Williams [29]. The output of the optimal ranking algorithm is a list
that contains the true positive warnings at the top and all the false positive warnings
at the bottom. In this work, generating a ranking list close to the optimal ranking list
was are main objective. A secondary objective was to outperform the random ranking
algorithm, which randomly shuffles the warnings generated from the open-source
software.
To assess our work, we measured the strength of association between the optimal
and the generated ranking list and the direction of the relationship using the Kendall
and Spearman rank correlation measurement. A value of a positive one indicates
a perfect degree of association between the optimal and the generated ranking list,
which we tried to achieve.
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Table 5.6 presents the Spearman rank correlation values between the optimal
ranking algorithm and the proposed framework. We used the Cohen’s standard to
determine the strength of the relationship between the generated and optimal. From
this table we can observe that all the correlation values were positive and greater
than, or equal to 0.877. This means there is a strong match between the optimal
ranking algorithm and the proposed framework. This also means that our framework
outperforms the previous studies.
Table 5.6.: Spearman rank correlation comparing with optimal
Dataset Name Proposed Framework
CWE-126-Tool6-open-source 0.970
CWE-134-Tool6-open-source 0.877
Table 5.7 presents the Spearman rank correlation values between the random
ranking algorithm and the proposed framework. From this table we can observe
that the correlation value between the proposed framework and the random ranking
algorithm are negative for the dataset that represents CWE-126 warnings. This
conclusion shows that there is no match between the random ranking algorithm and
the proposed framework. In other worlds, there is no similar ordering of the false
positive warnings between the algorithms.
Likewise, the correlation value between the random ranking algorithm and the
proposed framework was positive but less than 0.10 for the dataset that represents
CWE-134 warnings. This correlation value declares that there is a weak correlation
between the random ranking algorithm and the our framework based on the Cohen’s
standard. Finally, we can infer that the our framework also outperforms the random
ranking algorithm.
Table 5.7.: Spearman rank correlation comparing with random
Dataset Name Proposed Framework
CWE-126-Tool6-open-source -0.036
CWE-134-Tool6-open-source 0.0065
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5.5.7 Threat to Validity
For this work, the threat to validity is related to the number of SCA tools used to
evaluate the framework. For example, we did not include any of the state-of-the-art
commercial tools because they are not freely available. We will work to address this
threat in our future work (see Chapter 6).
5.6 Summary of Contributions
In this chapter, we have presented the Static Code Analysis Tool’s Warnings
Ranking (SCATWR), which is a framework to rank the warnings generated for real-
world source code using software engineering metrics value. The following are the key
contributions of the SCATWR.
• Proposing a framework to mitigate the false positive issue by prioritizing the
SCA tool warnings for the purpose of guiding developers toward the most serious
ones.
• Using software engineering metrics to rank the SCA tool warnings.
• Using instance weighting technique to transfer the RF classifier trained using
Juliet test suite to rank the warnings collected from the open-source software.
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this dissertation, we have proposed approach which can be used to improve the SCA
tools performance using the ML techniques based on the source code metrics value.
First, we presented the Static Code Analysis Tools Evaluator (SCATE) framework.
SCATE evaluates the SCA tools in terms of source code metrics by running them
either locally or remotely using the SWAMP. This framework uses the Understand
static tool to compute the Volume, Complexity, and Object-Oriented metrics from
the highlighted source code by the SCA tools. Likewise, the framework was used to
convert the given source codes into a set of attribute files (ARFF).
Second, we presented the Static Code Analysis Tool Warnings Classification
(SCATWC) framework, which is a framework to auto-construct a number of predictive
models (classifiers) using four of machine learning techniques (KNN, SVM, RF, and
RIPPER) from eight generated datasets. Each dataset represents a number of specific
CWE test cases and a SCA tool’s warnings. Where the dataset features show the
degree of complexity and coupling for the given source code (synthetic source code)
and the label or class value represents the type of SCA tool warning (true positive,
false positive, and false negative) for this source code. This framework uses F1-score
to evaluate the performance of each classifier. This metric shows that the Random
Forest classifier outperforms the rest of the classifiers.
On the other hand, we used this framework to evaluate which of source code
metrics are highly correlated with the true positive, false positive, and false negative
warnings generated by an SCA tool. We then described SCATWR a proposed
approach for ranking the SCA tool warnings collected from a number of open-source
software projects using both the source code metrics and the Domain Adaptation
(DA) technique (instance weighting technique). The following is a summary of lessons
109
learned from the research work presented in this dissertation and some future research
directions.
• Based on our current results for SCATE framework and the case study that we
used choosing an SCA tool for a given source code depends on several important
factors, such as the weakness the developers want to test for, the value of one or
more of the source code metrics, and finally the structure of the given source
code. For example, Tool1 does not perform well with the source code that has
a high number of CountPath for CWE-476. Tool 1, however, performs better
when the real-world source code (Xerces-C++) has a high number of paths.
• The experimental results of SCATE framework show that there is a relationship
between the number of the uncovered flaws by SCA tools and the value of the
software engineering metrics.
• Five of SCA tools that support both the C++ and Java programing language and
also its rules mapping to CWEs have been evaluated using SCATE framework.
In the future, we plan to extend this research to cover more open-source SCA
tools that analyze Python, Ruby, C++, and Java source code.
• SCA tools results report a large number of false warnings (e.g., false positive).
The manual inspections of the false warnings is an unavoidable, time-consuming,
and costly process.
• The overall results of the SCATWC show that the performance of the RF
technique is the best on average across the other examined ML techniques. Its
average F1-score is 90.4%, while the performance of the RIPPER technique is
the second best one. Its average F1-score is 87.7%.
• The CountInput, Knots, CountOutput, CountPath, Cyclomatic, and Essential
were considered as the most important software engineering metrics over the
eight datasets to predict the behavior of SCA tools against a given synthetic
source code.
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• False positive and false negative warnings can be reduced if the developers
rewrite their source code in a way that reduces source code complexity, coupling,
and usage of global variables.
• The overall results of SCATWR framework show that the proposed framework
determines a threshold value where the warning that has a confidence value
larger than the threshold value can be considered as a true positive warning.
On the other hand, the developers do not need to check the warning that has
a confidence value less than the threshold value since the proposed framework
considers this warning as false positive.
• RF technique was used to build two different ranking models for two common
weaknesses (CWE-134 and CWE-126). Both of the models outperform the
random ranking algorithm and generate a ranking list that has a high positive
correlated with the optimal ranking algorithm.
• We only used a single SCA tools to validate SCATWR framework. But, we still
need to investigate applying the framework across different SCA tools (including
commercial tools), and against more CWEs. This will help us understand if the
framework is both tool and CWE independent.
For future research efforts, we will apply our approach to source code from various
open-source and commercial software projects. Likewise, we are planning to compute
the software engineering metrics at the line level in order to reduce the number of
contradictory data points in the generated datasets. Lastly, we plan to extend our
approach by covering more SCA tools and using other advanced ML techniques.
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